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AUTOMATED GOVERNMENT FOR VULNERABLE CITIZENS:
INTERMEDIATING RIGHTS
Sofia Ranchordás* and Luisa Scarcella**

ABSTRACT
Filing tax returns or applying for unemployment benefits are some of the most
common government transactions. Yet interacting with tax and social security authorities is for many a source of government anxiety. Bureaucracy, regulatory delays, and
the complexity of the administrative legal system have been regarded for decades
as the key reasons for this problem. Digital government promised a solution in the
shape of simplified forms, electronic filing, and better communication with citizens.
In the United States, privately developed software systems such as TurboTax and
MiDAS emerged as intermediaries between citizens and digital government, selling
convenience and efficiency. These systems help citizens comply with their government
obligations and apply for benefits. But they also allow governments to identify fraud
on a large scale. This Article argues that automations, particularly when intermediated
by private technology companies, are double-edged swords for different reasons.
First, they help reinforce tax enforcement systems that typically target vulnerable citizens (e.g., low-income, underrepresented communities). Second, the price of
the convenience offered by automation is different, depending on who you are. For
average, middle to high-income, tech-savvy citizens who can interact with digital
government without assistance, automation is a convenient alternative to the traditional bureaucracy. However, for vulnerable citizens who do not have access to stable
Internet or a computer, or are unable to interact with technology, automation has
failed to promote equalitarian access to public services and government decisionmaking. Existing scholarship has primarily focused on the discriminatory effects of
big data, and the opacity and biases of algorithms without delving into the problem
of the broader design of digital government and automation and how it leaves vulnerable citizens behind.
This Article addresses this issue by exploring how the interaction between
bureaucracy, digital technology, and power asymmetries can have dehumanizing
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Faculty of Law, The Netherlands & Associate Professor of Law, Innovation, and Sustainability
at LUISS Guido Carli, Italy. Affiliated Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale
Law School. We would like to thank Madalina Nicolai for her research assistance. Many
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effects for vulnerable citizens. This Articles contribution to the literature is twofold:
First, it explores how technological intermediaries (both privately and publicly
developed) operate and reshape the relationship between citizens and governments;
second, it demonstrates how technology has deepened existing vulnerabilities and
what needs to be reformed in this context.
INTRODUCTION
We are connected to government from cradle to grave: all citizens, regardless of
their socioeconomic status, income, and skills should be able to connect to government on a regular basis, for example, to request a birth certificate, register property,
get married or divorced, file their taxes, and apply for the social welfare benefits they
are entitled to.1 In the digital age, government transactions have become dematerialized with paperless forms, government websites, smartphone applications, and digital
identities.2 At the same time, budget cuts have forced governments to seek higher
efficiency through technologies which enable them to automate tasks, combat tax and
welfare fraud more effectively, and reduce personnel costs.3 The transition to digital
government services is guided by the assumptions that citizens wish to embrace digitization and that regardless of their age, education, and experience, they can perform a
multitude of government transactions merely with the assistance of technological intermediaries (e.g., TurboTax, a well-known software for tax return preparation).4 Furthermore, the shift to digital government with unsupervised digital intermediationbut
more information onlineis thought to help simplify administrative procedures,
improve public communication, and ensure that citizens will be better connected to
government.5 However, these assumptions are flawed on many accounts.
1

DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 12732 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck
eds., 2004) (discussing the proliferation of data flows and in particular, the multiplication of
public records). See generally Subhajit Basu, E-Government and Developing Countries: An
Overview, 18 INTL REV. L. COMPUT. & TECH. 109, 110 (2004) (defining e-governance and
discussing the application of e-government and its increasing importance in citizens lives,
comparing its implementation in developed countries to developing countries).
2
See, e.g., Fernanda Paula Oliveira & Carla Machado, Papers, My Friend, Are Blowing
in the Wind: Towards a Paperless Administration, 7 PERSPS. L. & PUB. ADMIN. 1, 17 (2018)
(discussing the shift to a paperless public administration which was designed to advance administrative simplification and modernization).
3
See Marvin van Bekkum & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Digital Welfare Detection
and the Dutch SyRI Judgment, 23 EUR. J. SOC. SEC. 323, 32325 (2021) (discussing how SyRI
was used to detect fraud in welfare beneficiaries).
4
See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation,
58 B.C. L. REV. 151, 16368 (2017) (criticizing the limited regulation of tax return preparation
software and proposing reflections for a comprehensive tax preparation process reform).
5
But see, e.g., Florian Pethig, Julia Kroenung & Markus Noeltner, A Stigma Power Perspective on Digital Government Service, 38 GOVT INFO. Q. 101545 1, 1 (2021) (discussing the
avoidance of digital government services among citizens with disabilities in Germany).
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This Article argues that in our current digital society, there are three phenomena
that simultaneously connect and disconnect citizens from government and impede
millions of individuals from exercising their rights on equal terms: bureaucracy,
technology, and power asymmetries.6 This Article discusses the relationship between
these three phenomena and explains why technology, as an intermediary between
citizens and governments, has enhanced longstanding power asymmetries and affected the ability of vulnerable citizens to have equal access to administrative justice.
This Article does not limit the support of its analysis to U.S. law and legal scholarship.
Rather, since these phenomena have socioeconomic or cultural dimensions and are
already present in Western countries implementing digital government, this Article
without being strictly comparativerelies on interdisciplinary literature (e.g., public
policy, public administration, and communication sciences) and comparative legal
scholarship, referring to relevant international examples from which U.S. law can
draw lessons. This argument proceeds in three steps.
First, scholars have studied for decades the impact of bureaucracy on citizens
ability to exercise their rights when contacting public authorities: red tape, delays,
inconsistent rules, incomprehensible language, and procedures regularly confuse
citizens and dissuade them from requesting services they are entitled to.7 Contrary
to Kafkas novel The Castle, which offers a critique of public administrations of his
time, nowadays, administrative tyranny is no longer defined by paper trails and the
power conferred by paper-based bureaucracy.8 The tyranny of paper has been replaced by digital trails which have failed to deliver the promise of a transformational
digital government with fewer bureaucratic hurdles and more transparency.9 Digital
6

See, e.g., Joshua Burraway, Nobodies and Somebodies: Power, Bureaucracy, and Citizenship in a London Rehousing Hub, 10 HAU: J. ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 130, 132 (2020) (exploring the use of bureaucracy technologies as mediators in housing policies for homeless
citizens and discussing how these technologies enhance already existing asymmetrical power
relations between the homeless and local housing authorities); BENJAMIN ROSETH & ANGELA
REYES, WAIT NO MORE: CITIZENS, RED TAPE AND DIGITAL GOVERNMENT 6 (2018) (analyzing
government transactions and how their complexity impedes citizens from exercising their
rights, with special focus on Latin America and the Caribbean).
7
See Barry Bozeman, A Theory of Government Red Tape, 3 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. &
THEORY 273, 27879 (1993) (discussing the concept of red tape and the negative implications
of bureaucratic rules, in particular how certain rules may help some citizens but hurt others);
WENDY WAGNER, INCOMPREHENSIBLE! 46 (2019) (analyzing how the U.S. legal system fosters
incomprehensible language). Specifically, on bureaucracy and the adversarial treatment of
citizens on welfare, see INSA KOCH, PERSONALIZING THE STATE: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW,
POLITICS, AND WELFARE IN AUSTERITY BRITAIN 21617 (Kyle Treiber & Loraine Gelsthorpe
eds., 2018) (exploring the relationship between stigmatized citizens and government and
discussing how state control can be regarded as adversarial).
8
Carlos Santiso, The Digital Revolution and Better Public Policy, 2019 POLITIQUE
ÉTRANGÈRE 131, 13739 (analyzing the transition to a paperless public administration and its
effect on the advancement of the transparency and efficiency of government).
9
MIRIAM LIPS, DIGITAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM IN THE
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government services remain politically tainted, procedures are still path-dependent
and, in some cases, there is a cumulation of digital and analogue obligations for citizens
(e.g., fill in forms online, then print, sign, and mail them).10 Few countries across the
globe have built digital governments from scratch.11 This point brings us to the
second step of our argument: technology has not reduced administrative burdens but
it has become, for many citizens, an additional layer of bureaucracy that can only be
navigated with access to a computer, stable Internet, and digital skills. Millions of
citizens throughout the United States still lack these conditions or require human
assistance when engaging with digital government services (e.g., applying for welfare
benefits, filing taxes online).12 The digital divide, now commonly defined as different levels of unequal participation in the digital society, is alive and well. Still, its
effects on access to digital government transactions have been overlooked. 13 The
DIGITAL ERA 48 (2019) (discussing the evolution of digital government). Public policy literature has further demonstrated that the success of digital government and the ability to
generate citizen trust requires a transformational type of digitization of public services rather
than the simple digitization and web enabling of processes. See Mohamed Mahmood et al.,
The Role of Information and Communications Technology in the Transformation of Government
and Citizen Trust, 86 INTL REV. ADMIN. SCI. 708, 70910 (2019).
10
During the pandemic, on August 28, 2020, the IRS announced that it would temporarily
allow the use of digital signatures on certain forms that cannot be filed electronically. IRS,
IRS Adds Six More Forms to List That Can Be Signed Digitally; 16 Now Available (Sept. 10,
2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-adds-six-more-forms-to-list-that-can-be-signed-digi
tally-16-now-available [https://perma.cc/EC5V-BBJJ] (showing that the number of fully digital
forms remains limited).
11
Estonia is the key example of a digital government which was built from scratch and does
not rely on pre-existing systems and procedures. See Velko Lember et al., Technological Capacity in the Public Sector: The Case of Estonia, 84 INTL REV. ADMIN. SCI. 214, 21617 (2018).
12
Andrew Perrin & Sara Atske, 7% of Americans Dont Use the Internet. Who Are They?,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/02/7-of
-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/DT82-RAQK] (explaining
Internet non-adoption on the grounds of a survey conducted in early 2021. According to the
survey, non-adoption is explained by a number of demographic variables such as age, education,
and household income.); see also Emily A. Vogels, Digital Divide Persists Even as Americans
with Lower Incomes Make Gains in Tech Adoption, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 22, 2021), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/22/digital-divide-persists-even-as-americans-with
-lower-incomes-make-gains-in-tech-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/46SJ-L23W] (showing that
broadband adoption and smartphone ownership have not reduced the inequality between
Americans with lower and higher incomes. While high-income Americans are more likely to
own multiple devices and be able to go online more often, 13% of low-income adults do not
have access to any of these technologies).
13
There is abundant literature on the digital divide and its different degrees. See ELLEN
J. HELSPER, DIGITAL DISCONNECT: THE SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DIGITAL
INEQUALITIES (2021); Joanna Goode, The Digital Identity Divide: How Technology Knowledge
Impacts College Students, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOCY 497, 498 (2010); Ellen J. Helsper &
Bianca C. Reisdorf, The Emergence of a Digital Underclass in Great Britain and Sweden:
Changing Reasons for Digital Exclusion, 19 NEW MEDIA & SOCY 1253, 125355 (2016);
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design of digital government assumesoften wronglythat citizens are self-reliant,
have access to technology, and have enough time, mental capacity, and average digital
skills to engage critically with new digital tools.14 While the number of citizens who
benefit from the automation and digitalization of government services has increased,
many equally deserving citizens living in remote areas, belonging to older generations, immigrant communities and other underrepresented minorities, have been left
behind.15 For example, during the pandemic, millions of senior citizens encountered
problems registering for their COVID-19 vaccines and obtaining trustworthy information about them.16
The technological intermediation of government transactions is not only burdensome and likely to disadvantage vulnerable citizens, but it also has significant legal
implications for the administrative system (e.g., it reduces the legitimacy of public
authorities due to the delegation of agency expertise to software) and the exercise
of rights.17 The third step of our argument is thus focused on the legal implications
of the unequal exercise of rights before digital government and how this translates
itself into the harsher enforcement of law for vulnerable citizens.18 Contrary to a
Alexander van Deursen & Karen Mossberger, Any Thing for Anyone? A New Digital Divide
in Internet-of-Things Skills, 10 POLY &INTERNET 122, 12224 (2018) (discussing the digital
divide from a skills perspective with regard to the development of Internet-of-Things); Christoph
Lutz, Digital Inequalities in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 1 HUM. BEHAV.
& EMERGING TECH. 141, 14142 (2019).
14
See ANNE-GREET KEIZER ET AL., WHY KNOWING WHAT TO DO IS NOT ENOUGH: A
REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON SELF-RELIANCE 7, 29 (Corien Prins & Frans Brom eds., 2019)
(analyzing the importance of limited mental capacity and the gap between knowing what
ones rights are and what procedures need to be followed and what needs to be done to exercise
them. This book discusses the concept of self-reliance).
15
See Goode, supra note 13, at 49899 (discussing that gender, race, socioeconomic status,
primary language, geographical location, disability status, education level, and generational
characteristics indicate disparate use of technology); van Deursen & Mossberger, supra note
13, at 13334 (highlighting a survey that showed differences in understanding of complex
internet systems based on certain factors).
16
Francesco Bronzino et al., Mapping the Digital Divide: Before, During, and After COVID19, TPRC48: THE 48TH RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND
INTERNET POLICY (2021) (discussing the inequities in broadband Internet access as well as
citizens ability to develop themselves).
17
On the problem of intermediaries in e-government, see Marijn Janssen & Bram Klievink,
Do We Need Intermediaries in E-Government? Intermediaries to Create a Demand-Driven
Government, 220 AMCIS 2008 PROCS. (2008). On digital government and legitimacy, see
Danielle J. Citron & Ryan Calo, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of Legitimacy,
70 EMORY L.J. 797, 798 (2021) (offering a thorough analysis of the legitimacy deficit of the
automation of government). For an extensive analysis of the use of automation in government, see DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 6, 21, 22 (2020); David Freeman
Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic Accountability in the Administrative State, 37 YALE
J. ON REGUL. 800 (2020).
18
On the values and models of administrative justice, see JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC

378

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:373

sheet of paper, technological intermediaries used in the automation of government
services are not neutral.19 Digital technology is a paradoxical intermediary between
citizens and governments: at first sight, technology conveys the appearance of convenience and simplicity leading to the reduction of human assistance, the automation
of services and rights, and the growing deference of courts to technological evidence.20 In reality, simplified online interfaces, particularly in the tax realm, have
proven to be double-edged swords and sources of inequality, especially when technology is developed by private companies whose interests and values are not aligned
with those of the public.21 Simplified online government interfaces without complementary human assistance require citizens to fully trust them and the way in which
they interpret the law.22 This is problematic from a legal perspective for three reasons.
First, the failure to engage critically with digital government can mean that citizens
do not fully exercise their rights.23 Second, a poor understanding of digital government and their underlying administrative rules and procedures can lead to flawed
results.24 Third, as citizens have unequal control over what data is generated, processed
and for what purposes, when technology is used to verify the eligibility for benefits
and detect fraud, citizens who do not fully understand the functioning of the system
may be placed in an unfair and unequal position with important consequences.25
Digital government worsens the position of disadvantaged citizens not only
because of the potential biases of the data upon which it bases its data, but also
JUSTICE 2325 (1983); see also generally Jerry Mashaw, Models of Administrative Justice,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE (Joe Tomlinson et al. eds., 2021).
19
See, e.g., Abe Chauhan, Towards the Systemic Review of Automated Decision-Making
Systems, 25 JUD. REV. 285, 28589 (2020) (discussing the role of automated decision-making
in the United Kingdom and presenting algorithms as biased products of human creation which
evade legal scrutiny because of technical features, propriety interests, or issues of scale).
20
See Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Automated Legal Guidance, 106 CORNELL L.
REV. 179 (2020) (explaining how online tools are used to oversimplify complex law and arguing
that governments should prevent automated legal guidance from widening the gap between
access to legal advice enjoyed by high-income and by low-income individuals). The phenomenon
of simplexity had been detected earlier by the same authors in the context of the shift to
plain language in written communication with the public. See Joshua D. Blank & Leigh
Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the Tax Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 189, 204, 20507 (2017).
21
For a general discussion of how automation challenges administrative law values, see
Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Proceduralism and Automation: Challenges to the Values
of Administrative Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE OF PUBLIC LAW 12, 21 (Elizabeth
Fisher et al. eds., 2020).
22
Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Automated Legal Guidance, 106 CORNELL L. REV.
179, 24243 (2020).
23
See id. at 195201.
24
See id. at 22728, 23031.
25
For a thorough discussion of the problem of data inequality, see generally Angelina Fisher
& Thomas Streinz, Confronting Data Inequality (N.Y.U. Sch. L. Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper
No. 21-22, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3825724 [https://perma
.cc/WM2L-4G55].
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because of the way in which technology operates as an asymmetric intermediary of
rights.26 It processes data according to categories that fit primarily average citizens,
uses statistical data without accounting for its historical meaning, and builds risk
profiles that reinforce discriminatory stereotypes. Also, there rarely is an opt-out
option for digital government, particularly when it comes to fraud detection, as the
choice of specific tools remains, in many countries, within the scope of a public
authoritys discretionary powers.27 Once technology has delivered certain results,
it is sometimes almost impossible to obtain access to reconstruct the path that was
once followed to reach a decision.28 Citizens accidental mistakes are thus difficult
to distinguish from intended fraud.
An example of this problem, which has drawn great attention throughout the
world, is the Dutch childcare benefit scandal.29 Over the last decade, 26,000 Dutch
families were victims of the mentioned triumvirate (bureaucracy, technology, power
asymmetries) as they were wrongfully accused of fraud, their childcare benefits
were cancelled, and they were requested to return thousands of euros with interest.
Many of these families who were already struggling to make ends meet, were driven
into situations of homelessness, bankruptcy, and some even lost to their children to
the system due to the psychological and financial stress they faced.30 More than half
of these families had immigrant or vulnerable backgrounds which were identified
by algorithmic systems designed to detect large-scale fraud.31 Most of these citizens
were caught in the system due to their inability to navigate the complex administrative system: They had made administrative mistakes due to their misunderstanding
of legal requirements, digital illiteracy, or, when accused of fraud, they were unable
to offer evidence that they had not committed it.32 In 2021, after a parliamentary
26

See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 222126 (2019);
Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 115 (2017);
James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda for
Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 22124 (2019) (explaining
how the big data processed by modern algorithms perpetuates longstanding inequalities and can
lead to biased results that disadvantage people of color and people from low- and moderateincome communities).
27
See Cahoo v. Fast Enters., 508 F. Supp. 3d. 138, 144 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2020) (Plaintiffs, former claimants in Michigans unemployment compensation system, claimed in this
suit that their constitutional right to due process of law was infringed when the defendants
designed, built, and implemented an automated system to detect and punish individuals who
submitted fraudulent unemployment insurance claims.).
28
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 12951300
(2020) (acknowledging the problem of opaque algorithmic governance in the public sector
and investigating the importance of the Freedom of Information Act and other state equivalents
as avenues to obtain access to algorithms).
29
See JESSE FREDERIK, ZO HADDEN WE HET NIET BEDOELD (2021) (in Dutch).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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report showed that tax authorities had wrongfully accused these citizens and the courts
judicial reviews were inadequate, the Dutch government resigned over this scandal.33
The Dutch Prime Minister apologized for this injustice, acknowledging that innocent people [had] been criminalized and their lives ruined.34 Despite the promises
of financial compensations for the victims of this scandal, tax authorities remained
largely unaccountable for this situation and this scandal has not yet led to significant
reforms of the way in which digital government operates in the Netherlands.35
As this Article aims to show, the Dutch childcare benefit scandal example is not
an isolated case across Western countries. In the United States, the automation of
government, particularly in the tax and social security areas, has equally resulted in
unequal access to administrative justice. TurboTax, a tax preparation software, and
the Michigan Integrated Data Automated System (MiDAS), a fraud detection system,
are examples of this.36 These tax and fraud detection software systems introduce an
additional dimension to the problem of the critical digitization of government functions
and services: they are technological tools developed by private actors which are
implemented for specific purposes. For example, MiDAS sole goal was to generate
new fraud cases and it did.37 MiDAS, much like the Dutch childcare benefit scandal,
was difficult to rebut, even though the state of Michigan was frequently unable to
support MiDAS fraud accusations.38 The system was kept in place for more than
two years, resulting in thousands of wrongful accusations and the seizing of millions
of dollars in wages and tax returns.39 Despite the evident flaws of this system, the
judicial battle for legal redress was burdensome for many citizens. Notwithstanding
these circumstances, several other states, cities, and towns, pressured by budget cuts,
have in the meanwhile embraced automated systems to detect eligibility for unemployment and other benefits.40
This Article adds to existing legal scholarship on algorithmic biases, the automation
of government, algorithmic accountability and transparency of digital government,
33

Id.
Anna Holligan, Dutch PM Rutte Government Resigns Over Child Welfare Fraud Scandal,
BBCNEWS (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55674146 [https://perma
.cc/LYK5-6CYE].
35
See id.
36
Justin Elliott & Paul Kiel, Inside TurboTaxs 20-Year Fight to Stop Americans From
Filing Their Taxes for Free, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica
.org/article/inside-turbotax-20-year-fight-to-stop-americans-from-filing-their-taxes-for-free
[https://perma.cc/2PS9-MVM7] (discussing TurboTax as a tax preparation product); Alejandro
De La Garza, States Automated Systems Are Trapping Citizens in Bureaucratic Nightmares
with Their Lives on the Line, TIME (May 28, 2020, 2:24 PM), https://time.com/5840609
/algorithm-unemployment/ [https://perma.cc/TZD9-NF42] (explaining MiDAS as a way to
detect fraud).
37
See De La Garza, supra note 36.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
34
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and discrimination.41 This Article is organized as follows. Part I explains how the
automation of government has evolved in the last decades and how the digitization
and automation of services have inevitable benefits and costs that are not always
accounted for. Part II delves into three examples that illustrate the digitization and
automation of tax and social security services: TurboTax, MiDAS, and the Dutch
Childcare benefits scandal. In Part III, this Article discusses some of the key legal
issues raised by digitization and automation of government on citizens rights before
government. Part IV reflects upon how the digitization and automation of government and law enforcement should be adapted to meet the needs of vulnerable citizens.
I. THE AUTOMATION OF GOVERNMENT
This Part offers a brief overview of the evolution of the digitization of government and the switch to automated public services. As a growing number of government resources and services are transitioning to the digital realm in the United States
as well as in many other countries of the world, citizens are required to engage with
online government services.42 This Part also briefly addresses the problem of unequal
access to digital government.43
A. Digitization of Government
Over the past decades, governments across the globe have invested in the digitization of information, the development of governmental portals and digital identities, the automation of several public services and administrative decisions, and the
integration of services.44 The dominant narrative regarding digital government presents
41

See Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 132223 (1992);
Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. L.F. 355, 35859; Danielle
Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 125152 (2008); Solon
Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Datas Disparate Impact, 102 CAL. L. REV. 671, 674 (2016);
VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE,
AND PUNISH THE POOR 18088 (2018); Jennifer Cobbe, Administrative Law and the Machines
of Government: Judicial Review of Automated Public-Sector Decision-Making, 39 LEGAL
STUD. 636, 637 (2019).
42
See generally Basu, supra note 1 (addressing how engagement with e-government impacts
citizens of different backgrounds).
43
See Katharine V. Macy, Digital Divide Challenges Access to E-Government, 42 DTTP:
DOCUMENTS TO THE PEOPLE 36, 36 (2014) (discussing how the digital divide impacts the
access to e-government).
44
Cem Dilmegani, Bengi Korkmaz & Martin Lundqvist, Public-Sector Digitization: A
Trillion-Dollar Challenge, MCKINSEY (December 2014), https://www.mckinsey.com/busi
ness-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/public-sector-digitization-the-trillion-dollar-chal
lenge [https://perma.cc/U4C4-6GVF].
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it as the process of changing how governments deliver public services, draw on collected data to make data-driven decisions and enact evidence-based policies, improve
the transparency of public administration, and leverage technology to improve public
services.45 Digital technology can automate time-consuming processes, allowing for
large savings in the emission and enforcement of simple bulk decisions.46 Also, reliance on technology has improved the availability of public information as well as the
way in which governments communicate with citizens.47 To illustrate, during the pandemic, governments employed social media platforms to disseminate information
and pandemic measures which, in some cases, enhanced citizens trust in government.48
The digitization of government is, nonetheless, not a result in itself but a process
with several stages. The digitization of government started with the introduction of
technology in public offices (e.g., the digitization of paper documents) and it slowly
shifted from the internal use of technology for policy purposes to the partial or full
automation of public services.49 This evolution was accompanied by mounting
complexity and specialization, as well as by a shift from the term e-government
to the concept of digital government.50 In the United States, e-government has been
defined as [t]he use of informational and computer technology (ICT) to facilitate
interaction between, on the one hand, a public authority and, on the other hand, individual citizens, businesses, or non-governmental organizations.51 At the international level, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
which has played an important role in the dissemination of best practices in egovernment, defines it as the use of ICTs, and particularly the Internet, to achieve
better governance but often without significantly changing traditional structures and
back-office processes.52 In the United States, public authorities at both federal and
local levels started the digitization of government with the development of websites,
online filling of forms, and the creation of new avenues for the communication
45

See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 41, at 125153 (highlighting
how technology can lead to efficiency and transparency with procedural due process);
Cobbe, supra note 41, at 63637 (discussing automated decision-making systems).
46
See Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 41, at 125152 (discussing how
increased digitization leads to cuttings staffing and costs).
47
See Study on eGovernment and the Reduction of Administrative Burdens, COM (2014);
EU eGovernment Action Plan 20162020: Accelerating the Digital Transformation of Government, COM (2016) 179 final (Apr. 19, 2016); Mahmood et al., supra note 9, at 70910.
48
See generally Mahnaz Mansoor, Citizens Trust in Government as a Function of Good
Governance and Governments Agencys Provision of Quality Information on Social Media
during COVID-19, 38 GOVT INFO. Q. 101597 1, 3 (2021) (discussing how social media
communications enhanced trust during COVID-19).
49
See LIPS, supra note 9, at 69.
50
See id. at 614.
51
John C. Reitz, E-Government, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 733, 733 (2006).
52
OECD, BROADBAND POLICIES FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 361 (2016)
(ebook).
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between governments and citizens.53 Nowadays, most public authorities have moved
beyond this stage and currently use digital technology to reform not only the way
in which information is presented but also the essence of government transactions.
This second stage refers to the concept of digital government. 54
Digital government does not refer merely to the digitization of documents and
systems that were once based on paper trails. 55 Rather, it includes the creation of a
collaborative community between public authorities, businesses, and citizens. The
OECD defines digital government as the use of digital technologies, as an integrated
part of governments and the implementation of modernization strategies, to create
public value and swift to digital public services by design.56 This concept relies on
a digital government ecosystem consisting of government actors, non-governmental
organizations, businesses, citizens associations and individuals supporting the production of data, services and content through interactions with the government.57
The concept of digital government includes therefore the transition to user-centered
and user-driven approaches to services that aim to advance the digital transformation
and enable government service delivery.58 Furthermore, digital government also relies
on ICT to increase the transparency of government and develop more open and userdriven approaches to public services to meet the users needs.59 It is in this context that
digital public services arise as services which are provided to citizens using internetbased technologies which mediate a citizens interaction with a public organization.60
B. The Automation of Government
Automation is currently used both in the public and the private sector: from
retirement funds and the banking sector to welfare benefits, automated systems have
53

See, e.g., Macy, supra note 43, at 36 (discussing the increasing amount of government
resources and processes transitioning to e-government); see also William A. Fenwick &
Robert D. Brownstone, Electronic Filing: What Is It? What Are Its Implications?, 19 SANTA
CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 181, 182 (2002) (explaining the process of e-filing); John
G. McNutt, Electronic Government, the Internet, and Disasters: An Emerging Relationship,
34 DTTP: DOCUMENTS TO THE PEOPLE 17, 17 (2006).
54
See Tomasz Janwoski, Digital Government Evolution: From Transformation to Contextualization, 32 GOVT INFO. Q. 221, 223 (2015) (discussing the evolution of digital government
towards a more transactional and integrated presence of government on the Internet).
55
See id. at 227; Wim J.M. Voermans et al., Free the Legislative Process of Its Paper
Chains: IT-Inspired Redesign of the Legislative Procedure Cycle, 14 THE LOOPHOLE 54, 5863
(2012) (explaining how technology has reformed the paper-based legislative process).
56
OECD, RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON DIGITAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES
6 (2014).
57
Id. at 67.
58
Id. at 2.
59
Id. at 6.
60
See Claudia Elena Marinica, DigitizationThe Key for Adapting Good Administration
to a Better Governance, 8 ACAD. J.L. 111, 115 (2020).
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become ubiquitous in decision-making.61 In the United States, a recent report
revealed that 45% of the largest federal agencies in the country use or have experimented with artificial intelligence (AI) and machine-learning related tools.62 The
need to decide in bulk and within a short period of time are the common denominators of these fields where written rules and policies can easily be translated into
code to determine whether an applicant fulfills all the requirements for an administrative request.63
The terms automation and automated systems refer to information technologies designed either to produce measurements or assessments regarding a particular
case or to make an administrative decision in lieu of a civil servant.64 These systems
employ algorithms, that is, sets of defined steps so as to produce a certain output and
optimize tasks that would otherwise require extensive financial or human resources
(e.g., determine eligibility for a benefit based on a long list of requirements).65 While
some areas of decision-making (e.g., tax systems throughout the Western world) are
indeed being automated thanks to AI, a large number of public services rely on more
simple legal tech systems.66 The majority of public authorities rely on support expert
systems that provide data, rankings, indexes, and other types of preliminary analyses
so as to inform a human decision-maker. Human-in-the-loop-systems are made
thus by a government employee with the support of AI.67 An important and common
61

For a critical discussion of the use of automation in these sectors, see generally FRANK
PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY
AND INFORMATION (2015). See also Kevin C. Desouza et al., Designing, Developing, and
Deploying Artificial Intelligence Systems: Lessons from and for the Public Sector, 63 BUS.
HORIZONS 205, 20506 (2020) (noting the use of A.I. in both public and private sectors).
62
ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 17, at 6.
63
See Markku Suksi, Administrative Due Process When Using Automated DecisionMaking in Public Administration: Some Notes from a Finnish Perspective, 29 A.I. & L. 87,
98 (2020) (A public authority that wishes to speed up decision-making in matters it is in
charge of, in particular mass decisions, . . . decides by means of its own measures that the
process of decision-making will take place through ADM but decisions made by collegial
bodies . . . are not easy to transform into ADM, and thus that part of the constitutional
provision on collegiate accountability remains largely unaffected by ADM.).
64
Makoto Hong Chang & Hui Choon Kuen, Towards a Digital Government: Reflections
on Automated Decision-Making and the Principles of Administrative Justice, 31 SING.ACAD.
L.J. 875, 878 (2019).
65
Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically about and Researching Algorithms, 20 INFO., COMMCN
& SOCY 14, 1415 (2017). See generally Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms,
in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON COMMUNICATIONS, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167
(Tarleton Gillespie, et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the function and impact of algorithms on
public discourse).
66
See Bart Verheij, Artificial Intelligence as Law: Presidential Address to the Seventeenth
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, 28 A.I. & L. 181, 18486 (2020)
(outlining the current use of legal technology that does not amount to AI).
67
Ross P. Buckley et al., Regulating Artificial Intelligence in Finance: Putting the Human
in the Loop, 43 SYDNEY L. REV. 43, 66 (2021).
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distinction refers to the distinction between rules-based systems which apply sets of
pre-existing rules and employ decision-trees, and systems which rely on machine
learning.68 The latter is applied to more complex procedures as it enables algorithms
to learn from historical datasets, detect patterns, and make predictions.69 Contrary
to expert-based systems that are written as if-then rules, systems powered by
machine learning can result in inscrutable and non-intuitive outputs.70 In the public
sector, most automated systems drawing on machine learning are supervised, that
is, the learning algorithm is shown what a public authority aims to predict or classify
and learns thus by demonstration.71 A machine-learning system can be retrained using
new data to ensure that models can be adapted and corrected to changes.72 While the
possibility to keep learning from data can potentially improve the objective decisionmaking, it may be detrimental to its procedural guarantees.73 The constant flow of
new data into a machine learning system is likely to make it impossible to recreate
the conditions necessary to interrogate an earlier decision because the model does
not offer the required stability to be assessed.74 Public sector rules require nonetheless that information regarding updates of any system or logbook are archived so
that they can be made public and scrutinized.75 More recently, automation started
being used in social policy areas such as immigration law (identification of verification
of identity, processing of asylum requests), social welfare (eligibility for benefits),
and social housing.76
Despite the growing number of AI applications for government, the public sector
continues to lag behind the private sector in many different ways. Public authorities
still need to further develop their AI capabilities in order to deploy AI technologies
effectively to achieve their goals.77 For local public authorities, the development and
deployment of AI applications still involves significant financial investments that
68

Claire Hall, Challenging Automated Decision-making by Public Bodies: Selected Case
Studies from Other Jurisdictions, 25 JUD. REV. 8, 8 (2020).
69
Id.
70
ENGSTROM ET AL., supra note 17, at 11.
71
Reuben Binns, Algorithmic Decision-making: A Guide for Lawyers, 25 JUD. REV. 2,
3 (2020).
72
Id. at 5.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Bloch-Wehba, supra note 28, at 126869.
76
See id. at 1275; Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens
of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1108 (2013) (discussing
the governments use of automation for identifying immigration status).
77
Patrick Mikalef et al., Enabling AI Capabilities in Government Agencies: A Study of
Determinants for European Municipalities, 38 GOVT INFO. Q. 101593 1, 2 (2021) [hereinafter
Mikalef et al., Enabling AI Capabilities in Government Agencies]; see Patrick Mikalef &
Manjul Gupta, Artificial Intelligence Capability: Conceptualization, Measurement Calibration,
and Empirical Study on Its Impact on Organizational Creativity and Firm Performance, 58
INFO. & MGMT 103434 1, 2 (2021) (defining the concept of AI capabilities).
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are not always compatible with local budgets.78 Moreover, the employment of AI
applications by the public sector are also constrained by citizens perceptions and
the limited digital training of civil servants.79 Furthermore, digital government projects
often start with unspecified goals, limited stakeholder engagement, and reduced
attention to their social implications.80 In the case of tax authorities, digitization was
from the start designed to optimize bulk decision-making, facilitate tax return calculation, and improve the combat against tax evasion and fraud.81
C. Digitization of Tax Administration
Over the last two decades, technology was the primary driver for the modernization of tax returns. The first technology-driven improvement offered the possibility
to submit tax returns electronically.82 Electronically submitted tax returns facilitated
taxpayers submission, reducing costs for tax administrations while providing them
with data directly intelligible to fraud detectors.83 Following this first step, based on
the data available through previously submitted tax returns and third-parties reporting,
tax authorities started developing and providing taxpayers with pre-populated tax
returns.84 Pre-filled tax returns are generally available through the tax administrations
smart portals, where taxpayers can access, check and eventually correct their tax
returns.85 The digitalization of tax administrations aimed to reduce costs while meeting
78

See Mikalef et al., Enabling AI Capabilities in Government Agencies, supra note 77, at
4 (noting public organizations budgets may not allow for implementing new technologies).
79
See id. at 45 (discussing citizen perception of municipal AI capabilities and the
associated costs).
80
See Luis Felipe Luna-Reyes et al., Sensemaking and Social Processes in Digital Government Projects, 38 GOVT INFO. Q. 101570 1, 12 (2021) (identifying issues that impact
digital government including ambiguous goals and complex stakeholder networks).
81
Bloch-Wehba, supra note 28, at 1267.
82
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS E-FILE: A HISTORY 1 (2011) (reviewing the drive
towards e-filing tax returns).
83
IOTA, PRE-FILLED AND ELECTRONIC INCOME TAX RETURNS 6 (2008).
84
See OECD, USING THIRD PARTY INFORMATION REPORTS TO ASSIST TAXPAYERS MEET
THEIR RETURN FILING OBLIGATIONSCOUNTRY EXPERIENCES WITH THE USE OF PREPOPULATED PERSONAL TAX RETURNS 4 (2006) [hereinafter OECD, USING THIRD PARTY
INFORMATION] (describing the use of information held by revenue bodies to create prepopulated returns). The first use of pre-populated returns can be traced back to Denmark in
1988 and has been quickly followed by other northern countries like Sweden and afterward
by many other countries around the world. Id. at n.1.
85
With the advancement of the digital age, legislators are also facilitating the collection
of new types of information for the benefit of revenue agencies. For instance, many administrations are adopting a life event approach to service provision. This approach groups
and connects government services (tax authorities included) around key life events of the
taxpayer or their family, such as entering a relationship, the birth of a child, the registration of
a company, commencing school or tertiary study, starting employment, buying a home,
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taxpayers expectations for more convenient, seamless, personalized and effective
interaction with tax authorities and tackling tax evasion and fraud more efficiently.86
The second area where digitalization has played a predominant role is tax
enforcement, particularly in the design of fraud detector systems. Following the
financial crisis of 20082009, the need to maximize revenue spending and advance
new technologies drove further the digitalization of tax services and the automation
of tasks carried out by tax administrations.87 Algorithmic fraud detector systems can
automatically match data deriving from different sources, create risk-based profiles,
and flag possible discrepancies.88 By quickly analyzing thousands of tax returns and
data coming from other sources, algorithmic fraud detectors have been at the core
of the tendency adopted by governments in the area of enforcement, which Professor
de la Feria has described as selective enforcement.89 Tax enforcement is costly for
public administrations and its costs are directly proportional to the complexity of the
fraud.90 For this reason, tax administrations have been intensively investing in fraud
retirement, or the death of a family member. In this way, tax authorities will be directly receiving
relevant data from other authorities. See OECD, TECHNOLOGIES FOR BETTER TAX ADMINISTRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR REVENUE BODIES 26 (2016). At the same time, through
the adoption of tax policies recognizing tax benefits only depending on the use of traceable
electronic payments and the use of electronic health/ID cards, tax authorities will be easily
fueled by additional information on the taxpayer. This has, for instance, been recently introduced in Italy, where certain expenses can be deducted only if payments were made with
electronic means of payment. See Italy: An Evolving Payment Landscape, EUR. PAYMENTS
COUNCIL (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/news-insights/insight
/italy-evolving-payment-landscape [https://perma.cc/87CV-BDVP] (summarizing an interview with Rita Camporeale, Head of Payments Systems, Italian Banking Asssociation). This
type of information will also be directly included in the pre-filled tax return. Both cases raise
important concerns in the area of data protection, which, however, in this case, lie outside the
scope of this Article.
86
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., COMPREHENSIVE CUSTOMER SERVICE STRATEGY § 1101
(2021).
87
The increasing digitalization of revenue agencies and of tax services and functions has
been welcomed by international organizations such as the OECD, IOTA, IMF and the World
Bank. Over the years, several reports were published highlighting the milestones reached by
some revenue agencies around the world, foreseeing the future of tax administrations 3.0.
See, e.g., OECD, TECHNOLOGIES FOR BETTER TAX ADMINISTRATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
REVENUE BODIES (2016); OECD, TECHNOLOGY TOOLS TO TACKLE TAX EVASION AND TAX
FRAUD (2017); OECD, TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 3.0 (2019) [hereinafter OECD, TAX ADMIN.].
88
Cf. Esperanza Huerta et al., Framing, Decision-Aid Systems, and Culture: Exploring
Influences on Fraud Investigations, 13 INTL J. ACCT. INFO. SYS. 316, 317 (2012) (discussing
the increased use of automated systems in fraud detection because they have the ability to
analyze large amounts of data, and identify concerns based on patterns).
89
Rita de la Feria, Tax Fraud and Selective Law Enforcement, 47 J.L. & SOCY 240,
26669 (2020).
90
Id. at 248 ([T]he share of revenue lost within the EU to VAT fraud is considerable. This
is also supported by evidence of the increased scale of fraud, with some individual instances
of fraud so massive as to account in isolation for a significant amount of revenue loss.).
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assessment instruments fulfilling the promises of a cost-benefit analysis.91 Technological solutions represent the perfect blend of lower administrative costs and human
resources, enabling tax administrations to center their tax enforcement activity towards
tackling the low-hanging fruit vis-à-vis improving their performance statistics.92
D. Unequal Access to Digital Government
The rapid development of digital government has encountered an important challenge: the digital divide. In the early days of the Internet, the digital divide amounted
to not having any kind of access to the Internet.93 Nowadays, there is not one but
multiple digital divides which are caused by the lack of access to fast broadband,
limited access to computers, digital illiteracy, and a lack of meaningful opportunities
to use and engage with technology.94 For example, empirical research on access to
fast broadband in Los Angeles County based on data collected by the California
Public Utilities Commission has established that competition and fiber-based services
are less likely to be available in low-income areas and minority communities. 95 This
phenomenon is particularly visible in areas that combine poverty and a large share
of Black residents.96
In developed countries, the digital divide affects mostly the elderly and less
well-educated or poorer individuals.97 Senior citizens are the most likely to suffer
digital exclusion in developed countries, particularly those at the oldest ages.98 In the
United States, low-income households may have access to the Internet but there are
accounts of periodic struggles with its affordability as well as with the quality of
broadband. Developing countries continue to face greater challenges such as the
high level of inequality, underdeveloped IT infrastructures (in particular in rural
areas), and a lack of willingness or financial capacity of governments to invest in
91

Id. at 266 (noting that fraud assessment instruments are based solely on cost-benefit
analyses).
92
Id.
93
Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (2002).
94
See Daniela Ferreria et al., The Three Levels of the Urban Digital Divide: Bridging
Issues of Coverage, Usage and Its Outcomes in VGI Platforms, 124 GEOFORUM 195, 19697
(2021) (discussing levels of digital divide that include access, ability, and use).
95
Hernan Galperin et al., Who Gets Access to Fast Broadband? Evidence from Los
Angeles County, 38 GOV. INFO. Q. 101594, 1 (2021).
96
Id.
97
See Carol C. McDonough & David Kingsley, The Impact of Mobile Broadband on the
Digital Divide Affecting Older Adults, 22 INTL TELECOMMS. POLY REV. 27, 36 (2015) (noting
that age, education, and income have a significant effect on internet use); see also Yu, supra
note 93, at 16 (In low-income neighborhoods, rural areas, and the less developed countries,
basic literacy creates an even more significant barrier to digital participation.).
98
McDonough & Kingsley, supra note 97, at 3031 ([A]fter age 75, internet and broadband use drops off significantly.).
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technology.99 Although the degree of connectivity has increased significantly in both
developed and developing countries, the traditional digital divide in the form of inequality of access reflects existing inequalities in society in terms of income, rural/urban
location, immigration status, and education.100
These shortcomings are problematic as digital governments rely on the principle
of self-service, that is, the idea that citizens should be able to function more independently from the government and do not rely on human assistance when exercising
their rights. Citizens should be able to have access to public services using information technology from their home or, if possible, anywhere where they are connected.
In order to be efficient, self-service solutions should be customer-oriented and designed with individual citizens and their activity in mind. However, many of these
technological solutions often set aside more traditional, patronizing (albeit necessary)
ways of helping citizens (for example, civil servants that help older or illiterate citizens
fill in their forms).101
II. DIGITALIZING TAX ADMINISTRATIONS TASKS AND SERVICES
In this Part, three case studies on the digitization of tax law will be explored.
These examples serve three functions. First, they illustrate how the pursuit of efficiency and fraud detection with the help of digital government can easily overlook
constitutional and administrative guarantees.102 Second, these cases also demonstrate
that in the context of digitalizing tax administrations tasks and services, technology
is ultimately employed at the detriment of the most vulnerable citizens, low-income
taxpayers that do not have the means to seek professional or other form of legal
assistance.103 Third, one of these cases (TurboTax) illustrates well the impact of
relying on private companies when safeguarding public interests and how this
reliance on private technology companies can result in accountability and legitimacy
deficits.104
99

Cf. Yu, supra note 93, at 1718 (discussing the lack of capacity in sub-Saharan Africa
to benefit from the information revolution including spotty and antiquated equipment,
bureaucratic delay, state-owned monopolies, poverty, and unavailable power distribution in
rural areas).
100
Cf. id. at 35 (There are a lot of different divides, and the digital divide is only one of
them . . . Moreover, solutions to the digital divide and other, more traditional divides can
work together to reinforce each other.).
101
Cf. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 28, at 1269 (discussing government reliance on sophisticated decision-making technologies . . . engender[s] potent critiques of the credibility,
fairness, and due process implications of decision-making by algorithms significant for our
understanding of how automation might jeopardize individuals civil rights and liberties).
102
See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.
103
See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.
104
See Elliott & Kiel, supra note 36.
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A. TurboTax
In 2021, contrary to many developed countries, in the United States, taxpayers
still cannot file their tax returns online through a platform run and administered by
the federal government.105 To fill in and electronically submit their tax returns, taxpayers are referred to industry websites and software applications.106 Currently, more
than forty percent of taxpayers file their tax returns online and 40 million individuals
in the United States use a private software commonly known as TurboTax.107 This
software, provided by the company Intuit, allegedly aims to facilitate taxpayers to
navigate the complexities of the tax system and submit their tax returns. Taxpayers
are thus required to rely on a service provided by a private company and incur costs
to fulfil their tax obligations (file their tax returns).108
The complexity of filing tax returns which justifies the existence of TurboTax
is not unavoidable. In the past, different legislative proposals have sought to simplify
the tax return filing for taxpayers. Some of them never saw the light of Congress. 109
Others were successfully dismissed following Intuits active lobbying efforts, which
for years has been fighting and lobbying against some of the projects that have been
developed at the State level.110 Indeed, over the past two decades, Intuit has tirelessly
lobbied to block any government initiative designed to create a free government filing
system and pre-filing systems.111 For example, the commercial strategy adopted by
Intuit in 1999 already offered free tax preparation to the poorest filers in an attempt
to show that government intervention was unnecessary.112 Nonetheless, the start of
105

For all taxpayers, the IRS offers a Free File Program. For incomes less than $72,000,
taxpayers can utilize commercial platforms to file their tax returns for free as a part of publicprivate partnership between the IRS and private tax preparation companies. For taxpayers
with incomes exceeding $72,000, the IRS does not provide a platform to file their taxes but
does provide an electronic form for them to fill out and e-file. Free File: Do your Federal
Taxes for Free, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/filing/free-file-do-your-fed
eral-taxes-for-free [https://perma.cc/K7ZM-VV6U].
106
Id.
107
Elliott & Kiel, supra note 36.
108
Id. (noting that TurboTaxs free software did not include commonplace tax forms
requiring taxpayers to upgrade to paid versions).
109
For instance, two proposals were discussed in 2016. One was a data-retrieval return
system and the other a pro forma return system. These were debated also at the academic
level. See Joseph Bankman & James Edward Maule, Point & Counterpoint: Perspectives on
Two Proposals for Tax Filing Simplification, 35 AM. BAR ASSN TAX TIMES 9, 10, 16 (2016).
110
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Intuits Nine Lies Kill State E-Filing Programs and Keep Free
File Alive, STATE TAX NOTES 555, 556 (2010). In its analysis, the author identifies and offers
counterarguments to the claims made by Intuit at the detriment of free filing systems at the
state level. Id. at 55864 (identifying and disproving the nine most egregious falsehoods
Intuit made during its lobbying campaign).
111
Elliott & Kiel, supra note 36.
112
Id.
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Intuits active anti-encroachment strategy can be traced back to 2003, a moment of
crisis for the company that ultimately turned into a victory, thanks to the conclusion
of an agreement with the federal government.113 According to this agreement, the
IRS agreed to not compete with the [Free File Alliance] in providing free, online
tax return preparation and filing services to taxpayers.114 The agreement required
Intuit and a consortium of other companies to offer a bare-bones version of their
products to taxpayers with low incomes for free.115 The current eligibility for free
filing is set at an adjusted gross income below $72,000.116
However, the agreement on the free filing only required the companies to offer
free federal returns.117 This meant they could still charge for other products with the
free version of TurboTax (called Free Edition), which is filled with set-ups that
are designed to push customers to subscribe and pay for additional services.118 The
choice of the colors, words, and other system features are also based on the companys
pursuit to maximize the number of paying customers, independently of their eligibility for the free version.119 Thanks to the use of so-called dark patterns,120 Intuits
design nudges users to use services and engage in actions that are not necessary to
file for tax returns.121 At the core of the companys strategy there is a key insight,
113

Id.
The Free File Alliance was a collection of seventeen companies (another company is,
for instance, TaxAct). However, Intuit represents the major company active in the field. Elliott
& Kiel, supra note 36.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Recently, Intuit has dropped the IRS Free File Program. However, its Free Edition,
including the dark patterns described in this subsection, is still present on the market. Celine
Castronuovo, TurboTax leaving IRS Free File Program, THE HILL (July 16, 2021, 3:27 PM),
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/563442-turbotax-leaving-irs-free-file-program [https://perma
.cc/PU5Q-3RW8]; Sarah Szczypinski, TurboTax drops IRS Free File program. What that
means for you, CNET (July 22, 2021, 7:47 AM), https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/taxes/tur
botax-drops-irs-free-file-program-what-that-means-for-you/ [https://perma.cc/6QDZ-MMJK].
118
Intuits Free Edition has been at the core of the companys growth which has massively
advertised it, created a free free free free campaign, and even included a crossword puzzle
in The New York Times in which the answer to every clue was f-r-e-e. Elliott & Kiel,
supra note 36. In the meantime, a class action suit against Intuit has also started where the
plaintiffs alleged that the company duped eligible free filing taxpayers into using its paid
services, paying about $100 a year between 2015 to 2020. Aysha Bagchi, Intuit $40 Million
Proposed Settlement Rejected as Unfair (2), BLOOMBERG TAX (Mar. 6, 2021, 7:46 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-tax-report/40-million-intuit-proposed-settlement-re
jected-as-insufficient [https://perma.cc/YV8P-X54S].
119
Elliott & Kiel, supra note 36.
120
Dark patterns were documented by ProPublica. Id.
121
This use of dark patterns to trick customers to pay for services that they do not need
also emerges from claims made by former employees of Intuit. The state return was the most
common service offered, but the Free File Alliance companies could also pitch loans, audit
defense, or even products that had nothing to do with taxes. The concerns arising from
114
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which is technically known as government anxiety.122 Taxpayers anxiety around
tax filing is so overwhelming that ultimately, even if asked to pay, they will do it
rather than start the entire process anew and risk any possible contention with the
IRS.123 These companies capitalized on taxpayers anxiety and bureaucratic frustration since filing a tax return is required by law, and the non-compliance with this
obligation can even result in jail sentences. Indeed, taxpayers find it easier, faster,
and more convenient to file their taxes electronically than to use the traditional paper
filing, the former option being facilitated by the industrys services of online tax
preparers.124 At the same time, tax compliance software, like TurboTax, seems to
comply with substantive tax law by simplifying complex cases in different ways and
making rules more intelligible to users.125 In cases that are naturally simple, they often
incorporate government guidance verbatim, while in complex cases, they seem to
prefer to interpret the law in a way that minimizes the risk of an audit. 126 This different behavior can be explained through market incentives. Since these companies
free websites offered by the industry as their part of the commercial strategy were also
addressed in an exhaustive 2006 report by the Taxpayer Advocate. The report documents
inaccuracies in the free software provided to low-income taxpayers and documents a history
of upselling in the program. As it emerges from the report, upgrades offered by Intuits site
included $20 for a more complete product, $50 for a professional review, and $35 for an audit
defense, which covers only the cost of representation, not the cost of amounts due on audit.
In addition to these fees, there were additional costs for processing fees, which in reality
were disguised forms of high interest refund anticipation loans. Even though the eighth version
of the Memorandum of Understanding to the Free File Agreement in its current version includes a list of requirements to be respected by tax filing companies such as faithfully directing
taxpayers to free software instead of upselling, ProPublicas investigations show that tax
filing companies have been breaching the agreement and several class action lawsuits on the
alleged breach of contract, violation of consumer protection, false advertising and unfair
competition law have started. Id. The MOU specifically refers to an obligation to clearly
list their free customer service options through their landing page, and in the case of a
taxpayer ineligible for a providers Free File alternative, the taxpayer shall be redirected back
to the IRS Free File landing page so that the taxpayer can immediately consider other Free
File offers. Eighth Memorandum of Understanding on Service Standards and Disputes Between
the Internal Revenue Service and Free File, Incorporated, §§ 4.15.4, 4.19.2(iii). Susan C. Morse,
Do Tax Compliance Robots Follow the Law?, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L. J. 278, 286 (2020).
Similarly, the Los Angeles City Attorney has filed two lawsuits, one against H&R Block and
one against Intuit, asserting violations of Californias unfair competition statute. Id.
122
See generally Zeila Gallo & Insa Koch, Personalizing the State: An Anthropology of
Law, Politics, and Welfare in Austerity Britain, Clarendon Studies in Criminology, Oxford,
83 MOD. L. REV. 237 (2019).
123
Joseph Bankman, Mr. Smith Gets an Education: Why It Is So Hard to Get Easy Tax
Filing (Nov. 19, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (N.Y.U. Tax Policy Colloquium) [hereinafter
Bankman, Mr. Smith Gets an Education].
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Morse, supra note 121, at 280.
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are trying to sell peace of mind and lower the possibilities of being subjected to
audits, adopting the safest legal interpretation minimizes the chances of being subject
to a tax audit while profit-maximizing. Differently, more aggressive legal interpretations could damage the softwares reputation in case of tax audits. While TurboTax
would not be directly liable for these flaws, the company aims to avoid bad publicity.127
In practice, this conservative legal interpretation means that taxpayers may be paying
more taxes than what is due per the legal requirements. The companys assumption
is that the mistake might go unnoticed by the taxpayer, and that the government will
not object to an error in their favor.128
Another concern is that taxpayers who have a very simple tax return to submit
but which is above the threshold individuated for lower-income taxpayers free
filing, will still be required to pay for the service for the online submission regardless. Since the government will not accept returns unless they come through a tax
preparation company, taxpayers are unable to submit their tax return online without
paying for an online tax preparation companys service.129 The refusal to accept any
but industry-prepared returns could only be justified if it were prohibitively expensive for the government to accept electronic returns. However, it is in the governments interest to accept electronic returns instead of paper returns, as this allows
for a rapid match of the returns with already existing data at the IRS for the sake of
detecting eventual discrepancies.130
It is important to mention that some taxpayers still rely on paid professional and
human tax preparers. However, many taxpayers cannot afford to hire a tax adviser
which is significantly more expensive than the paid version of TurboTax.131
A final question that is often raised pertains to the liability for possible mistakes
made in the tax returns submitted through a tax software. There is already copious
case law and scholarly work on whether TurboTax can be considered as comparable
to a tax preparer.132 Nonetheless, the main question that persists is: Why cant the
U.S. government pre-fill forms and send out a tentative tax return? As in many other
countries, the U.S. government already has the wage and interest income on which
the return is based and uses that information for its own calculations of tax liability,
127

Id. at 30205.
See Bankman, Mr. Smith Gets an Education, supra note 123, at 6162.
129
Id.
130
On the importance of simplifying tax filing for both taxpayers and tax administration
see Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to Simplify Individual Tax Filing, 61 NATL TAX J.
773, 77375 (2008).
131
Id. at 774.
132
Kacey Marr, Youre Only as Good as Your Tax Software: The Tax Courts Wrongful
Approval of the Turbotax Defense in Olsen v. Commissioner, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 709, 71415
(2013); see, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Court Rejects Geithner/Turbo Tax Defense, TAXPROF
BLOG (Nov. 25, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/11/for-firsttime.html
[https://perma.cc/UF8L-A7FL]; see also Blank & Osofsky, supra note 22, at 23940.
128
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against which it checks the numbers on the taxpayers return.133 This solution would
facilitate taxpayers life while simplifying the IRS assessment of the effective declared income.134 While issues in terms of digital and tax literacy of the taxpayers
filing the tax return will not be simply solved by introducing a pre-filled online tax
return administered by the IRS, its implementation would still represent a more
equitable improvement of the current situation.135
B. MiDAS
The story behind Michigan Integrated Data Automated System (MiDAS) fits well
with the recent trend to automate the welfare state.136 After the financial crisis struck
and revenues started to fall rapidly, states decided to enhance their fraud detection
systems. This included acquiring a $47 million unemployment algorithmic decisionmaking system, MiDAS.137 Initially, this system had three main aims: first, to ensure
that unemployment checks were distributed only to eligible individuals; second, to
increase the Unemployment Insurance Agencys (UIA) efficiency and responsiveness to unemployment rising claims; third, to reduce UIAs operation costs by eliminating more than 400 workers, which at the time was one-third of the agencys staff.138
133

See Bankman, Mr. Smith Gets an Education, supra note 123, at 45.
Id.
135
At the political level, there has been a renovated interest in the matter. For instance,
Senator Elizabeth Warren has been very vocal on this issue in the past years and together with
other Senators reintroduced in 2019 the Tax Filing Simplification Act to ease the tax filing
process. This act was first introduced in 2016 by Senator Warren and reintroduced in 2017.
Moreover, a way forward could also be the simplified tool launched in 2020 by the IRS to
help families access their relief payments even if they were not required to file their taxes.
This tool was then used in 2021 for the new child tax credit expansion. Even though this system
presents some downfalls and its not hosted on a government website, we agree with the
authors that if redesigned as a government-run, simplified tax-filing system just requesting
the needed information to issue IRS anti-poverty benefits, it could facilitate easy access to
benefits for low-income families and over time, be used to generate pre-filled tax returns.
Cassandra Robertson & Gabriel Zucker, The IRS Is the Nations Largest Anti-Poverty Benefits
Administrator, SLATE (Aug. 11, 2021, 5:50 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/08/irs
-anti-poverty-benefits-administrator-child-tax-credit.html [https://perma.cc/RSN8-F6PD].
136
For a general reflection on the automation of the welfare state, see EUBANKS, supra
note 41; for a specific analysis of MiDAS in the context of the assessment of administrative
discretion, see Doaa Abu Elyounes, Computer Says No!: The Impact of Automation on the
Discretionary Power of Public Officers, 23 VAND. J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. 451, 45558 (2021).
137
Matthew B. Seipel, Robo-Bureaucrat and the Administrative Separation of Powers,
2020 CARDOZO L. REV. DENOVO 99, 105 (2020).
138
Id.; Editorial, State Will Pay For Cutting Corners with Unemployment System Automation, TRAVERSE CITY REC. EAGLE (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.record-eagle.com/opinion
/editorials/editorial-state-will-pay-for-cutting-corners-with-unemployment-system-automa
tion/article_6794c522-192b-11ea-9df2-676c5450b875.html [https://perma.cc/56DM-LYBC];
Robert N. Charette, Michigans MiDAS Unemployment System: Algorithm Alchemy Created
134
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Soon after MiDAS introduction, the number of persons suspected of unemployment
fraud grew fivefold compared to the average number found using the old system.139
Consequently, the new algorithmic decision-making system generated an unprecedented amount of revenue for the UIA.140 Nonetheless, despite the alleged benefits
in terms of efficiency, Michigans implementation of MiDAS turned out to be catastrophic, as it resulted in over 34,000 false accusations of unemployment fraud.141 The
financial stress and pressure on the accused individuals caused a series of personal
tragedies, ranging from evictions to divorces, to credit score destruction, to homelessness, and to bankruptcies.142 If the individuals failed to make the repayments
that reached a maximum of $187,000the state could immediately garnish a persons
wages, seize federal and state income tax refunds, and start a criminal referral
against them.143
MiDAS clearly shows how automated systems can exacerbate already existing
structural issues. Lawyers and advocates representing accused fraudsters discovered
that many wrong fraud accusations were generated algorithmically with no human
intervention or secondary review of the accusation, leading to 93% margin of
error.144 Even in the many cases which included a human-in-the-loop, the system
still showed a 44% error rate.145 The system received incomplete data, made no
distinction between fraud and mistakes made in good faith, and drafted computergenerated notices in such a way that recipients would inadvertently admit to fraud.146
Often, the errors consisted of small mistakes or inconsistencies that were not attributable to the claimants but that nonetheless, triggered fraud determinations. 147
Lead, Not Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 24, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/michigans-midas
-unemployment-system-algorithm-alchemy-that-created-lead-not-gold [https://perma.cc
/5PV4-F9VU#toggle-gdpr].
139
TRAVERSE CITY REC. EAGLE, supra note 138; Charette, supra note 138.
140
The harsh penalties of 400% on the claimed amount of fraud also contributed to the
sharp rise. Charette, supra note 138.
141
Id.
142
MICHELE GILMAN & MARY MADDEN, DIGITAL BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN THE
WAKE OF COVID-19 (DATA & SOCY 2021); Ryan Felton, Criminalizing the Unemployed,
DETROIT METRO TIMES (July 1, 2015), https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/criminalizing-the
-unemployed/Content?oid=2353533&storyPage=2 [https://perma.cc/4K2G-DQ6T].
143
See Felton, supra note 142.
144
A study found that from October 2013 to September 2015, MiDAS robo-adjudicated
40,195 cases with no human involvement, and those had an 85% error rate. Charette, supra
note 138.
145
Id.
146
GEORGE WENTWORTH, CLOSING DOORS ON THE UNEMPLOYED: WHY MOST JOBLESS
WORKERS ARE NOT RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND WHAT STATES CAN DO
ABOUT IT 13 (Natl Emp. L. Project 2017).
147
Among the glitches and flaws of MiDAS, the system flagged fraud workers that stated
a reason of separation different from the one given by a former employer, or if their earnings
were in the same calendar quarter in which they were paid unemployment insurances. Id.

396

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:373

MiDAS also flagged claimants through an income spreading formula.148 According to this formula, MiDAS calculated a claimants income in a fiscal quarter and
averaged the claimants weekly earnings, even if the claimant did not make any
money in a given week.149 Furthermore, if the employees reported no income for any
week during a quarter in which they earned income, MiDAS automatically determined
that the claimant had engaged in fraud.150 Additionally, notifications were sent to old
addresses or through dormant online accounts that workers no longer checked since
they had long stopped receiving those benefits.151 The agency also did not take any
additional steps (such as emails, mail, or phone calls) to notify the claimants and
failed to answer more than 90% of the calls to its Help Line.152 Consequently,
there was the possibility that by the time the workers received the subsequent
notification, the thirty-day period to contest or appeal the fraud determination had
already passed.153 Claimants were also not informed about the basis for fraud suspicion, and MiDAS did not allow fact-based adjudication, but automatically sent
them multiple-choice questionnaires.154 These questionnaires included questions and
possible answers that were insufficiently clear and possibly self-incriminating.155
MiDAS also exemplifies the risks arising from delegating authority to software
developers without safeguarding administrative discretion.156 For the design and
implementation of MiDAS, the UIA relied on outside contractors. In the appeals,
Michigan civil rights lawyers claimed that those contractors were entrusted with
government duties and were therefore responsible for any constitutional violations
brought on by MiDAS wrongful allegations.157 A recent opinion by Judge David
Lawson opened the possibility for individuals who had been falsely accused of fraud
to proceed with their lawsuit against not only the UIA but also against the private
companies involved in the design and implementation of the robo-adjudication
system.158 Indeed, according to the Opinion of Judge David Lawson, because FAST
and CSG worked hand-in-hand with the UIA in developing and managing the
MiDAS system (which included the deficient notice procedures), the plaintiffs
alleged injuries are fairly traceable.159
148

Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 89293 (6th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 89394.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 894. Out of the last 50,000 calls the Help Line received before the Auditor
General conducted the audit, not a single one had been answered or returned. Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 893.
155
Id.
156
Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364, 37274 (2019).
157
De La Garza, supra note 36.
158
Cahoo v. Fast Enters., 508 F. Supp. 3d. 138, 162 (E.D. Mich. 2020).
159
Id.
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C. The Dutch Childcare Benefits Scandal
In January 2021, the Dutch Prime Minister resigned following the publication
of a report on what is commonly referred to as the Childcare Benefit Scandal. 160
The crux of the matter was the illegal recovery of social benefits which forced many
benefit recipients into financial ruin.161 According to the Dutch welfare systems,
parents are eligible for a state contribution toward the costs of daycare, which can
add up to ninety percent of the actual costs for low-income families. 162 In order to
receive these benefits, parents must either work or study, and register their children
at a licensed kindergarten.163 These benefits are paid every month to the account of
the recipient and it is meant to help parents pay for the kindergarten fees.164 The
amount of the benefit is primarily dependent on the parents income.165 Even though
this amount is subject to a preliminary automatic calculation on the Dutch tax
authorities website, the requesting and complying with all legal requirements is the
parents responsibility.166 Consequently, in the case of a wrongfully paid out allowance
(for example, the child stayed at home with a relative and was not sent to the kindergarten), recipients would have to pay the benefit back.167
Following several infamous and highly mediatic benefit fraud scandals involving Bulgarian and Turkish immigrants, Dutch tax authorities were under pressure
in the last decade to increase their scrutiny. To prevent fraud, an ICT system was first
introduced in 2011 and later improved to conduct checks on a larger scale.168 However, the systems meant to detect the undue receipt of benefits ultimately mislabeled
over 26,000 parents as fraudsters, with a disproportionate emphasis on citizens with
an immigrant background.169 The Report of the Parliamentary Questioning Committee
(Commissie Van Dam) released in December 2020, concluded that more than 26,000
families were on the verge of bankruptcy.170 Hunted down, forced to pay back undue
amounts and denied future applications, the courts systematically delayed and
ignored these families appeals.171
160

Eindverslag onderzoek kinderopvangtoeslag overhandigd, TWEEDE KAMER (Dec. 17,
2020), https://www.tweedekamer.nl/nieuws/kamernieuws/eindverslag-onderzoek-kinderop
vangtoeslag-overhandigd [https://perma.cc/J3LF-SLES].
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
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In some cases, the reclaim of benefits was due to minor errors,172 while in other
cases, families were singled out by automated risk selection systems.173 As it results
from a report of the Dutch Data Protection Authority on this scandal, the classification of the benefit claims was delegated to a self-learning algorithm which operated
as a first filter.174 Based on risk classification models using a dozen indicators, the
system flagged specific welfare recipients as possible fraudsters.175 The Dutch Data
Protection Authority established in its report that at least from March 2016 to October
2018, there was improper discriminatory processing based on the nationality of the
applicants.176 The selected beneficiaries were then subjected to a second manual
scrutiny by the tax officials, which rarely corrected the results presented by the
algorithm.177 As recognized in December 2020 in the report of the Parliamentary
Questioning Committee, certain claims by parents with double citizenship and
foreign-sounding surnames were systematically identified by the algorithm as highrisk and hastily marked by the officials, showing how institutional racism was an
inherent element of the audit practices.178 On January 7, 2021, the Netherlands Public
Prosecution Service announced that no criminal investigation would be initiated
against the Dutch tax authorities for their unlawful and discriminatory administrative
172

For example, a missing signature or one missing two-hundred euro payment would be
flagged as fraud, and consequently would have led to parents having to pay back the whole
amount of benefits received for the entire year. Id.
173
Id.
174
Werkwijze Belastingdienst in strijd met de wet en discriminerend, AUTORITEIT PERSOONSGEGEVENS [Dutch Data Protection Authority] (July 17, 2020), https://autoriteitpersoon
sgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/werkwijze-belastingdienst-strijd-met-de-wet-en-discriminerend
[https://perma.cc/5CJS-ECTC] (in Dutch).
175
Jon Henley & Robert Booth, Welfare Surveillance System Violates Human Rights,
Dutch Court Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2020, 8:18 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2020/feb/05/welfare-surveillance-system-violates-human-rights-dutch-court
-rules [https://perma.cc/7FQK-YQPD].
176
Belastingdienst/Toeslagen De verwerking van de nationaliteit van aanvragers van
kinderopvangtoeslag, AUTORITEIT PERSOONSGEGEVENS [Dutch Data Protection Authority]
(July 17, 2020), https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/onderzoek
_belastingdienst_kinderopvangtoeslag.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX87-S6QP].
177
As reported by commentators, the tax authority admitted that at least 11,000 parents
were selected for an extensive inspection because of their ethnic origin or dual nationality
and alarming references by the tax authority officials to parents as a nest of Antilleans (nest
van Antillianen) were found in internal communications. See Nani Jansen Reventlow, Automated
Racism: How Tech Can Entrench Bias, POLITICO (Mar. 2, 2021, 4:05 AM), https://www.politico
.eu/article/automated-racism-how-tech-can-entrench-bias/ [https://perma.cc/8MFB-YM8M].
178
See Parlementaire Ondervragingscommissie, Ongekend Onrecht [Unprecedented Injustice], TWEEDEKAMER (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.tweedekamer.nl/sites/default/files/atoms
/files/20201217_eindverslag_parlementaire_ondervragingscommissie_kinderopvangtoeslag
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YAQ-UFJ3]; see also Dutch Committee Issues Scathing Report into
Benefit System, A.P. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/mark-rutte-netherlands
-europe-f56f7f76b3d96537bfd93e595914730e [https://perma.cc/D58N-FPEF].
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actions.179 The victims of this scandal were promised a handsome financial compensation but in the first half of 2021, most families had not yet received it.180 At the
time of writing, the dissatisfaction with proposed solutions remains. For thousands
of parents who lost their homes, jobs, and, even in the case of a law student who was
wrongfully accused of fraud, their children to the system, this compensation is insufficient. The Judicial Division of the Dutch Council of State (the Dutch Supreme Court
for a number of administrative cases) acknowledged that the judicial system also
failed these families, that too much trust had been placed on the actions of public
authorities and their procedures, and that too little consideration had been given to
the difference between the law and its enforcement. A reflection and possible reform
of these aspects of judicial review has been promised by the President of this court.
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Administrative justicethe process through which the [S]tate makes decisions
about [their citizens,] is increasingly affected by technology.181 Nonetheless, technology, when used to address bureaucracy, deteriorates the position of citizens before
government and courts. This is particularly true for the most vulnerable citizens in
our societies.
This Part reflects first on the key values of administrative law that should be
respected in the shift to digital government and automated decision-making. It then
focuses on the role played by technology in what has been described as selective
enforcement and on the backlashes of private actors involvement in the development
of digital government.
A. Key Values of Administrative Justice in the Digital Sphere
Traditionally, the key values of administrative justice include openness; confidentiality when privacy, trade secrets or national security are at stake; transparency;
fairness; accountability; consistency; participation; rationality; equity; and equal treatment.182 However, an open question remains: How [are] these values effectively
179

Geen strafrechtelijk onderzoek naar Belastingdienst [No Criminal Investigation into
the Tax Authority], OPENBAAR MINISTERIE [The Netherlands Public Prosecutor] (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/01/07/geen-strafrechtelijk-onderzoek-naar-belasting
dienst [https://perma.cc/BWW8-QZVH].
180
Childcare Benefit Scandal Victims to Get 30,000 Compensation, DUTCHNEWS.NL
(Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2020/12/childcare-benefit-scandal-victims
-to-get-e30000-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/DC63-ZXW8].
181
JOE TOMLINSON, JUSTICE IN THE DIGITAL STATE at ix (2019). See generally MASHAW,
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE, supra note 18 (discussing issues in administrative justice more
generally).
182
Martin Partington, Restructuring Administrative Justice? The Redress of Citizens
Grievances, 52 CURRENT L. PROBS. 173, 17984 (1999); see also Harlow & Rawlings, supra
note 21, at 5.
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[safeguarded] in the digital sphere?183 In tax law, it is important to understand
whether these values operate in the digital dimension differently than they do in the
analogical world.184 The detrimental effects of an increased digitalization of the tax
administration recounted in Part II raise questions regarding fairness, consistency,
and equal treatment.
1. The Price of Simplification
In theory, the process of digitalization of tax returns aims to increase simplification, which on paper should contribute to the fulfilment of the mentioned values.
However, tax law is notoriously complex185 and includes numerous detailed provisions interacting with each other.186 Against this backdrop, the uncertainties
sometimes also concerning basic tax law questionspersist, and they will reflect in
the ability of the taxpayer to calculate their own tax liability, particularly in countries applying a voluntary compliance system.187 Thus, the current status quo
entails that many taxpayers might find themselves in the situation of not being able
to fully understand their tax obligations. Indeed, this situation only highlights the
benefit from free, pre-filled tax returns prepared by governments with the data
already at their disposal.188 Moreover, even if in the past, scholars have described tax
183

See TOMLINSON, supra note 181, at 55.
In general, tax law is not considered exceptional but only different compared to other
legal fields. See generally Alice G. Abreu & Richard R. Greenstein, Tax: Different, Not Exceptional, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 663 (2019); Alice G. Abreu & Richard R. Greenstein, Tax as Everylaw: Interpretation, Enforcement, and the Legitimacy of the IRS, 69 TAX LAW. 493, 493 (2016)
[hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, Tax as Everylaw]. More specifically, in the latter, they have
argued that separating tax from the legitimacy shared by law generally, but has rendered
obscure, mysterious, and potentially illegitimate, decisions by tax administrators that would be
readily explainable and justifiable if seen through the lens of ordinary principles of administrative law. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The U.S. Taxpayer Bill of Rights:
Window Dressing or Expression of Justice?, 4 J. TAX ADMIN. 25, 34 (2018). In this sense,
the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR) would officially acknowledge how both the executive
and legislative branches of government recognized that the tax system holds itself subject to
principles of procedural justicethereby aligning it with other fields of law while at the
same time disregarding the idea of tax exceptionalism. See id. at 3435.
185
On how the level of complexity associated with tax law has even led to understanding
this legal field as exceptional, see Abreu & Greenstein, Tax as Everylaw, supra note 184, at
49798.
186
On the interaction between norms, see David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 871 (1999).
187
Such as the United States, as pointed out by Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Legal
Calculators and The Tax System, 15 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J., 73, 76 (2019) [hereinafter Blank
& Osofsky, Legal Calculators].
188
See OECD, USING THIRD PARTY INFORMATION, supra note 84, at 13 (detailing the
benefits and successes of using pre-filled tax returns).
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software companies as selling the simplification of the Tax Code,189 as pointed out by
Professor Lawsky, tax preparation programs are unable to encode and simplify the
law.190 Instead, these systems encode tax forms that are prepared by the government
itself.191 Hence, the coding activity starting from what the law prescribes is still
performed by the government: tax forms only turn law into algorithms applicable
by the taxpayers.192
However, the translation of law to the online world is not always fully neutral,
particularly when privately developed software companies are involved. Based on
market incentives, private tax preparation software can still affect the way taxpayers
comply with their obligations.193 Taxpayers are first obliged to determine their tax
legal situation against the complexity of the system. However, there is still the risk that
they fall prey to the practices adopted by the industry, which are designed to convince
taxpayers to contract unnecessary services or which prefer conservative legal interpretations which mean that taxpayers do not receive the tax returns they are entitled by
law.194 Differently, in other countries where pre-filled tax returns are designed and made
available by the government itself, the intermediary layer in the taxpayer-government
interaction represented here by a private company tax software is bypassed.195 The requirements of the law are integrated into the computer code and form simultaneously.196
2. Balancing Values: Fairness vs. Distributive Justice
In relation to fraud detectors, the values of fairness, accountability, and equal
treatment should also play a fundamental role. Although these values should be
easier to achieve through digital systems, the persisting risk is that the technological
solution itself might ultimately undermine them. Government employees without
digital skills and training may be tempted to blindly trust the technology or use it to
confirm their biases.197 At the same time, the lack of explanation of the reasons why
they have been flagged by the system can induce taxpayers to assume that the system
is correct in identifying an error or mistake.198 Moreover, as we move to online
189

J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Measuring Legal Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 196 (2015).
190
See Sarah Lawsky, Form as Formalization, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 114, 116 (2020).
191
See id.
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See id.
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See Morse, supra note 121, at 279; see also supra Section II.A.
194
See supra Section II.A.
195
See generally IOTA, supra note 83.
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Cf. Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 60, 7879 (2017) (noting
that formalizations that track statutory language may be of great utility).
197
See, e.g., Cobbe, supra note 41, at 641 (noting that one should not assume . . . that
machines make decisions which are free from human biases).
198
See supra Section II.B, which considered algorithmically generated fraud accusations
where the taxpayer would admit to the fraud the system suggested.
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notifications through government platforms, the digital divide will widen the discrepancies, impacting the possibility of challenging the decision if taxpayers are not
given timely digital notification.199 Indeed, in the tax context, the public interest to
fight tax evasion and fraud might hamper the need for transparency of the automated
system deployed by the tax administration. Revenue agencies might be reluctant to
provide too much information on the functioning of a fraud detector system, worrying that fraudsters will be able to circumvent it, should their design be revealed.200
It becomes then fundamental to strike the right balance between how much, or how
little, if any, of the functioning of a system can be disclosed. This is increasingly
relevant as tax authorities continue exploring the use of artificial intelligence.201
Thus, when confronted with outcomes deriving from black boxes, both revenue
agencys employees and taxpayers might not be in the position to syndicate that
result and assess possible errors.
The challenge of striking the right balance between different values in public
administration is already visible in legislative acts and proposals adopted in the
European Union. For instance, Article 23 of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), prescribes that the scope of the obligations and rights provided for in
Articles 12 to 22 and Article 34, as well as Article 5 (in so far as its provisions
correspond to the rights and obligations provided for in Articles 12 to 22) can be restricted in certain areas, including taxation. Consequently, for tax purposes, individuals can be subject to automated decision making and profiling.202 Lack of clarity
regarding the possible use of artificial intelligence and high-risk algorithms by tax
authorities for tax enforcement also emerges from the new EU proposal for a socalled Artificial Intelligence.203 Finally, backlashes from this concern have already
199

The notification in the online portal that was no longer checked by the alleged fraudster
because he stopped receiving the unemployment benefit, in relation to the MiDAS Scandal,
is a good example. See supra Section II.B. In that case the term to challenge the automated
decision had expired. Id.
200
Cf. OECD, ENDING THE SHELL GAME: CRACKING DOWN ON THE PROFESSIONALS WHO
ENABLE TAX AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES (2021) (summarizing the principle that knowledge
and expertise of the inner workings of a tax code can enable fraud).
201
See OECD, TAX ADMIN., supra note 87, at 56 (noting the potential of using Artificial
Intelligence in tax administration).
202
Even though the GDPR establishes some level of protection by requiring a legal basis
containing the information listed in Article 23 (2) and demands that measures interfering with
the privacy rights are proportional and necessary in a democratic society while respectful of the
essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms, it still leaves room for interpretation on how
much shall be revealed of an automated system. Tina Ehrke-Rabel, Big Data in Tax Collection
and Enforcement, in TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM 283, 29798 (Werner Haslehner et al. eds. 2019); Tina Ehrke-Rabel & Karl Franzens,
Profiling im Steuervollzug, 101 FINANZRUNDSCHAU 45, 4548 (2019) (Ger.). See generally
Luisa Scarcella, Tax Compliance and Privacy Rights in Profiling and Automated Decision
Making, 8 INTERNET POLY REV. 1, 57 (2019).
203
In particular, recital n.38 of the proposal states that AI systems specifically intended

2021]

AUTOMATED GOVERNMENT FOR VULNERABLE CITIZENS

403

emerged, such as in the case of the Dutch risk-profile system called System Risk
Indication (SyRI), which was scrutinized by the District Court of The Hague.204 In
its decision, the Court considered the fraud detector to be illegal on the ground of
its disproportionate interference with citizens privacy rights. 205 In this case, the government refused to disclose the risk model and the underlying risk indicators, arguing
that citizens could adjust their conduct accordingly.206 Even though examples like
MiDAS and the Dutch Childcare Benefits scandals (Part II) show that automation
primarily intensifies existing risks, the approach used in taxation to protect fundamental rights remains contorted.
B. Low-Hanging Fruit or Selective Enforcement
As Professor de la Feria has described, we are currently witnessing the rise of
low-hanging fruit or selective enforcement.207 Selective enforcement is the outcome
of anti-fraud policy choices following the 20082009 financial crisis that privileged
minimizing the revenue costs of tax fraud or maximizing revenue, rather than []
combating tax fraud itself.208 The more organized and complex fraud is, the more
costly it becomes to enforce tax law and build a solid case against it.209 Therefore, tax
administrations throughout the world have been designing their administrative actions
based on the costs of enforcement rather than fully optimizing tax administration.210
In other words, social security and tax agencies tend to focus on the low-hanging
fruit cases, that is, those that are easy to detect and thus increase their revenue without
to be used for administrative proceedings by tax and customs authorities should not be considered high-risk AI systems used by law enforcement authorities for the purposes of prevention,
detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL LAYING DOWN HARMONISED RULES
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ACT) AND AMENDING CERTAIN UNION
LEGISLATIVE ACTS, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 2021/206) 2728. Nonetheless, seeing the impact
on individuals rights as it emerged in the cases of the Dutch childcare benefit scandal, SyRI,
and MiDAS, it is questionable whether this limitation in scope is justified.
204
See generally van Bekkum & Zuiderveen Borgesuis, supra note 3, at 1215 (discussing
the ruling of a Dutch court which held that SyRI legislation violated the right to privacy
ensured by the European Convention of Human Rights).
205
See id. at 1213.
206
Case 09/550982, NCJM v. The Netherlands, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:1878 (Feb. 5,
2020). Previously, the government has also refused to give information to the Dutch Parliament,
fearing that the information would become public and that potential fraudsters could use that
information to escape algorithms risk analyses. See Bekkum & Zuiderveen Borgesuis, supra
note 3, at 6 (summarizing the statements of the Dutch State Secretary on this matter).
207
de la Feria, supra note 89, at 266, 269.
208
Id. at 269.
209
See id. at 245 (discussing the costs of organized tax fraud).
210
Michael Keen & Joel Slemrod, Optimal Tax Administration (Intl Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/17/8, 2017) at 1822, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues
/2017/01/20/Optimal-Tax-Administration-44555 [https://perma.cc/ZAG8-PGFY].
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requiring high administrative costs.211 This praxis is even more incentivized when
agencies are evaluated on the grounds of performance indicators. 212
The focus on enforcement activities that are less costly, but revenue-maximizing, has clear practical consequences. As it has emerged by a ProPublica investigation, Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) claimants are audited at a rate roughly
equal to the top-earning Americans (1.4 percent versus 1.6 percent). 213 The increasing attention given to low-income taxpayers seems to find its motivation in the
typical features of what constitutes selective enforcement.214 Unlike top-earning
individuals audits, the IRS argues that EITC claimants are audited frequently
because the audits can be automated and are cheaper to conduct without requiring
lots of IRS personnel resources and time.215 As the IRS is notoriously known for
being underfunded,216 the increasing automatization of fraud detectors seems inevitable. Notwithstanding, in the long run, these audits were of little help in reducing the
alleged tax fraud and the error rate on EITC claims remains high due to the complexity of the system.217
211

VALERIE A. BRAITHWAITE, DEFIANCE IN TAXATION AND GOVERNANCE: RESISTING AND
DISMISSING AUTHORITY IN A DEMOCRACY 200 (2009); DECLAN ROCHE, REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS NETWORK, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, TAX OFFICE PROSECUTIONS: FIRM
AND FAIR REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT 9 (2006); Magdalena Malecka, Not Your Business
but Your Liability: New VAT Third-Party Liability in Poland, 2 WORLD J. OF VAT/GST L.
253, 260 (2013).
212
See de la Feria, supra note 89, at 266; see also David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign
State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445,
458 (1996).
213
Paul Kiel, Its Getting Worse: The IRS Now Audits Poor Americans at About the Same
Rate as the Top 1%, PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2019, 10:16 AM), https://www.propublica.org
/article/irs-now-audits-poor-americans-at-about-the-same-rate-as-the-top-1-percent; Paul Kiel
& Jesse Eisinger, Whos More Likely to Be Audited: A Person Making $20,000or $400,000?,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 18, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/earned-income-tax
-credit-irs-audit-working-poor [https://perma.cc/V827-H2KA] (noting also that EITC recipients
were audited at twice the rate of taxpayers with income between $200,000 and $500,000).
214
In the past, Professor Book has highlighted the IRSs vigorous compliance effort toward
lower-income taxpayers and the problem regarding the scope of low-income taxpayers compliance. Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN.
L. REV. 1145, 115659, 116365 (2003); see also Leslie Book, The IRSs EITC Compliance
Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351 (2002).
215
Dorothy A. Brown, The IRS Is Targeting the Poorest Americans, THE ATLANTIC (July 27,
2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/07/how-race-plays-tax-policing/619
570/ [https://perma.cc/P4KL-VWCJ].
216
Recently [l]awmakers dropped plans to pay for a roughly $1 trillion infrastructure package in part by boosting tax-collecting enforcement at the Internal Revenue Service. Kristina
Peterson & Sarah Chaney Cambon, Senate Infrastructure Bill Drops IRS Funding, Raising
Pressure for New Revenue, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2021, 6:01 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ar
ticles/senate-infrastructure-bill-drops-irs-funding-raising-pressure-for-new-revenue-1162662
7260?page=1 [https://perma.cc/4XM9-FGLA].
217
TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, U.S. TREASURY DEPT,
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Furthermore, the replacement of human street-level bureaucrats by automated
systems raises the likelihood of an even more detached, possibly despotic, administrative government.218 Automated systems did not eliminate the bias of public officials.
Instead, they traded the possibility of human bias for the guarantee of systemic
bias.219 The blind trust of governmental officials in the correctness of the technology used will ultimately forge a selective enforcement system based on biases
without anyone questioning the underlying basis. When the automated system is
based on a wrong formula or has been trained with a biased dataset, the risks of tragic
outcomes, especially at the detriment of the most vulnerable groups, surge. Indeed,
there is a vast body of evidence on racial biases in algorithmic sentencing and risk
assessment processes.220 Consequently, the opacity of these systems, combined with
the risk of bias resulting from decisions taken at the design stage and the data used
to train automated systems, can reproduce or intensify inequalities already existing
in our society. This risk can emerge in the context of tax audits as well. As explained
in the work of Professor Jeremy Bearer-Friend,221 the lack of consideration of race
in the IRS audit statistics does not permit precise data on whether the IRS is currently conducting race-bias selective enforcement.222 From a digitalization of tax
2021-40-036 IMPROPER PAYMENT RATES FOR REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS REMAIN HIGH 34
(2021) (noting that twenty-four percent of EITC payments in FY 2020 were improper); see
also Brown, supra note 215.
218
Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making
in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1153 (2017); see NATL TAXPAYER ADVOC.,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 247 (2015); see also Leslie Book, Bureaucratic Oppression
and the Tax System, 69 TAX LAW. 567, 569 (2015) (In relation to the tax system and the double
role of the IRS which is on one hand a revenue collector and on the other hand a benefits
administrator, Leslie Book has both criticized and called on the IRS in administering the EITC
to recognize some of the characteristics of low income taxpayers, including low literacy rates,
less access to internet and technology generally, and an inability to readily secure documentation
that the Service may request in response to correspondence relating to eligibility.).
219
Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A Crisis of
Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L.J. 797, 819 (2021).
220
Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 838 (2014); J. Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-crimi
nal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/V2NT-66HM]; Heidi Ledford, Millions of Black People
Affected by Racial Bias in Health-Care Algorithms, NATURE (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www
.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03228-6 [https://perma.cc/E3CX-8BDX]; CTR. FOR DATA
ETHICS AND INNOVATION, INDEPENDENT REPORT: REVIEW INTO BIAS IN ALGORITHMIC
DECISIONMAKING (2020) (UK).
221
Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Colorblind Tax Enforcement, 97 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3890361 [https://perma.cc/93U7-PA7M].
222
See Brown, supra note 215 (A first step was taken on January 20, 2021, when
President Joe Biden signed an executive order on racial equity requiring data sets collected
by the federal government to be disaggregated by race. As pointed out by Professor Dorothy
A. Brown and Professor Bearer-Friend, it is necessary that the government starts tracking
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authorities enforcement activities, the lack of this data can have severe, dramatic
consequences. Fraud detector systems fed with data from previous audits lacking
information on race-based biases can ultimately lead to the design of a system that
inherently includes these biases.223 Thus, answering the outcry for more transparency
on the audit data on specific communities and based on race is essential from a
future-oriented perspective and in relation to how new technologies will be used in
tax enforcement in the years to come.
C. Public vs. Private Technology and Procedural Rights
The three cases analyzed in Part II also draw attention to the outsourcing for
government functions either to privately or publicly developed technology. Both in
the case of fraud detectors and tax preparation software developed by private companies, it can be questioned whether the detection and sanctioning of fraud can be
seen as an inherently governmental task, that is, a task that should only be exercised by public authorities.224 Indeed, delimiting the scope of inherently governmental tasks evoke the latent and still never outdated debate about the division
between the public and private spheres.225 Traditionally, the concept of inherently
governmental tasks has been connected to the idea that some public tasks are designed for the whole communitys benefit.226 Thus, they shall not be delegated to
private actors without a detailed legal basis for outsourcing them.227 As Professor
audits by race to address the biases in the system.); see also Bearer-Friend, supra note 221, at
39 (stating that the IRS is well positioned to produce statistics on race in tax administration).
On the more systematic issues of the racial inequities of the Internal Revenue Code and the
U.S. tax system, see generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE
TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANSAND HOW WE CAN FIX IT (2021) and
Francine J. Lipman et al., U.S. Tax Systems Need Anti-Racist Restructuring, 168 TAX NOTES
FED. 855 (2020).
223
Cf. Mayson, supra note 26, at 226367 (discussing the concerns about input variables
that do not properly account for racial bias).
224
In the United States this concept has been defined as a function that it is so intimately
related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees.
31 U.S.C. § 5015(2)(A). Under the nature of the function test, a task will be regarded as
inherently governmental if it involves exercising sovereign powers, depriving someone
of liberty in the name of public safety. See Fiona OCarroll, Inherently Governmental: A
Legal Argument for Ending Private Federal Prisons and Detention Centers, 67 EMORY L.J.
293, 297 (2017).
225
See Sofia Ranchordás & Ymre Schuurmans, Outsourcing the Welfare State: The Role
of Private Actors in Welfare Fraud Investigations, 7 EUR. J. COMPAR. L. & GOVERNANCE 5,
3133 (2020) (describing one side of the debate concerning whether private or public entities
are appropriate to certain tasks).
226
Carol Harlow, Public and Private Law: Definition without Distinction, 43 MOD.
L. REV. 241 (1980); KATHRYN CHAN, THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE NATURE OF CHARITY LAW 181
(Bloomsbury Publg 2016).
227
See JOHN R. LUCKEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R0641 INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL
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Rubin alerts, private sectors actors can contribute in their own right to creating
barriers to taxpayers and potential program beneficiaries since they are governed
by status differences, stranger relations, institutional pathologies, and divergent incentives.228 Given the pervasiveness and the way in which fraud detectors implemented through the use of new technologies affect fundamental rights while at the
same time pursuing a public interest, this activity seems to inevitably fall into this
category.229 As stated by Professor Steven J. Kelman, certain activities are regarded
as inherently governmental because they involve making policy decisions or rely
on the governments monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, and therefore are
inappropriate for contracting no matter what the other advantages of contracting
might be.230 This argument could also apply to contracting out IRS tax enforcement
and could convincingly be applied to contracting out the operation of prisons or
welfare benefit determination decisions.231 Nonetheless, also providing a tax preparation software necessary to comply with tax obligations can be seen as an indispensable service. Online filing options and pre-filled tax returns directly offered by
the government help to foster a trustworthy and collaborative relationship between
taxpayers and tax authorities.232
FUNCTIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS: BACKGROUND, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS
FOR CONGRESS (2009) (discussing the statutory and policy definitions of inherently governmental function); cf. Gerdy Jurgens & Frank van Ommeren, The Public-Private Divide in
English and Dutch Law: A Multifunctional and Context-Dependent Divide, 71 CAMBRIDGE
L. J. 172 (2012). See generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT
IT (2007); DAWN OLIVER, COMMON VALUES AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE (1999).
228
Edward L. Rubin, Bureaucratic Oppression: Its Causes and Cures, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 291, 342 (2012).
229
Ranchordás & Schuurmans, supra note 225, at 2631. In support for this conclusion
there is a position adopted in 2014 by the Dutch Hight Court for Social Affairs. This position
concerned a case involving private detectives and the Court sustained that even though the
Dutch Social Welfare Act offered room for the delegation of administrative tasks in general,
nonetheless law enforcement and fraud investigations constituted a core task of the public
administration which could not be delegated without a specific legal provision. Case 11/6506,
Centrale Raad van Beroep, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2014:2947 (Sept. 16, 2014) (Neth.).
230
Steven J. Kelman, Contracting, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE 307 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
231
See id.
232
Significant are the reactions by taxpayers which participated in the ReadyReturn
pilot program. See Bankman, Mr. Smith Gets an Education, supra note 123, at 11. Among
some Wow . . . Government doing something to make our lives easier for a change. . . . See
id. As Professor Bankman states in his work:
[t]he comments supported my prior belief that the problem with filing
wasnt just the time and money involved. Taxpayers dont write those
kinds of comments because they save $40, or a half an hour. They write
them because filing fills them with anxiety. Once a year they are made
to feel stupid, and frustrated, and this makes them angry and perhaps
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1. Due Process and Fraud Detector Systems
In fraud detector systems, private actors carrying out functions for which public
bodies are generally in charge raise important questions regarding accountability,
transparency, and fairness. Fraud detectors consist in software built to detect fraud
and build risk profiles.233 When taxpayers are identified as fraudsters, they will
consequently be notified.234 However, to exercise their due process rights, taxpayers
will have to be aware of how a particular outcome has been reached.235 From this
perspective, software like MiDAS or the one used in the Childcare Benefits scandal
are intermediating the possibility of exercising taxpayers due process rights.
However, as already pointed out by one of the authors of this Article in her previous
research, the fact that a system is built by a public agency or by a private company
can make a difference for different reasons.236 First, the contractual relationship
between private actors and the government is characterized by uncertainty. The lack
of accountability or the challenge of applying public law obligations to private
contractors that have traditionally characterized the privatization and outsourcing
of public tasks raise issues regarding transparency and fairness of the administrative
procedure.237 Second, the misalignment of public and private interests endangers the
pursuit of the public interest that fraud detectors aim to protect.238 Finally, outsourcing enforcement tasks to private companies can jeopardize the right to due process
and the right to non-discrimination of the alleged fraudster.239 Indeed, outsourcing
public tasks can lead to the severe endangerment of fundamental rights through
opaque and biased data-driven systems combined with the possible expansion or
reduction of discretionary powers beyond the original intent of the legislator. 240
Since the interpretation of vague and indeterminate terms is mainly based on past
a little paranoid. Most Americans dont want to hate their government,
but having to contend with even the simplest income tax returns pushes
a lot them in that direction.
See id.
233
See supra Section II.B (considering automatic fraud detectors in the MiDAS example).
234
See supra Section II.B (discussing this point and how notification might break down).
235
More generally, when it comes to taxpayers rights, how taxpayers are treated by the
agency will also have an impact on their voluntary compliance. As noted by the National
Taxpayers Advocate, [i]f taxpayers believe they are treated, or can be treated, in an arbitrary
and capricious manner, they will mistrust the tax system and be less likely to comply with the
laws voluntarily. If taxpayers have confidence in the fairness and integrity of the tax system,
they will be more likely to comply. NATL TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS,
MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS: TAXPAYER RIGHTS: THE IRS SHOULD ADOPT A TAXPAYER BILL
OF RIGHTS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE TAX ADMINISTRATION 20 (2013).
236
Ranchordás & Schuurmans, supra note 225, at 78.
237
Id. at 26.
238
Id. at 26.
239
Id. at 24.
240
Id. at 31.
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data analytics, the ultimate outcomes might be undesirable (e.g., the commission of
a crime by an individual belonging to a specific ethnic group that has defrauded the
system can lead to the system flagging all individuals belonging to a certain ethnic
group combined with other indicators).241 These types of issues can, nonetheless,
also arise in public automated systems, such as in the Dutch childcare benefit scandal.242
Due to the misalignment of interests and values between public and private parties,
the involvement of private companies in carrying out inherently governmental tasks
can enhance the risk of unfair, disproportionate, and discriminatory treatment. 243
Thus, under these circumstances, private companies developing automated systems
must follow ethical standards and align their technology with public values and rules
characterizing public law enforcement.244
In order to safeguard citizens procedural rights, data-driven systems and opaque
strategies should also be made transparent. Also, accountability mechanisms have
to be put in place to enable citizens to fully understand how a decision has been
made.245 Additionally, the implications of outsourcing of public tasks need to be also
considered from a digital divide perspective. Delegating inherently governmental
tasks to private companies must not be used as an excuse to avoid addressing
digital divide concerns in the area of digital government.
2. Tax Preparation Software
In many other countries (e.g., The Netherlands), TurboTax would not be necessary because tax authorities provide taxpayers with pre-filled tax returns which
already contain the most relevant income information.246 Nonetheless, the U.S. tax
system still largely relies on the market in the form of commercial preparers and
software to assist in the submission of the tax return and the application process for
benefits.247 Taxpayers acting as consumers can choose to purchase products or
services, which, albeit at a cost in terms of fees, enables them to gain access to those
benefits.248 Moreover, since the U.S. government only accepts online tax returns if
submitted by one of the private companies acting as their partners, these companies
241

Id. at 31.
Id. at 12.
243
Id. at 31.
244
Id. at 34.
245
See generally Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond
Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 181, 184 (2017) (advocating
for public engagement with algorithm systems of online enforcement).
246
Helaine Olen, Opinion: Americans Spend Hours and Hours Preparing Their Taxes.
We Shouldnt Have To., WASH. POST (May 15, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/2021/05/15/americans-spend-hours-hours-preparing-their-taxes-we
-shouldnt-have/ [https://perma.cc/CUM5-6Z56].
247
Leslie Book, Bureaucratic Oppression and the Tax System, 69 TAX LAW. 568, 587 (2016).
248
Id.
242
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also represent the only gateway to send a tax return online.249 From this perspective,
the software behind TurboTax intermediates taxpayers compliance to their tax
obligations (i.e., submitting their tax returns).250 At the same time, it intermediates
access to their rights since they will be entitled to tax refunds depending on the submission of their tax return.251 However, this intermediation comes at a cost masqueraded through dark patterns even when not due.
Although, as theorized by Professor Lawsky, tax preparation software is merely
transposing into computer code the algorithm already codified in tax return forms
by the government, and there is case law and scholarly debate on the consequences
of mistakes included in the tax return.252 Similarly, it has also been questioned
whether taxpayers reliance on computer tax software may be permitted as reasonable cause in good faith exempting taxpayers from the accuracy-related penalty of
section 6662(a) IRC (so-called TurboTax Defense).253 Moreover, another important
aspect in tax returns is how private tax preparation software interacts with the support
given through (automated) legal guidance by the IRS itself. Through what Professors Blank and Osofsky indicate as legal calculators (i.e., Interactive Tax Assistant
(ITA)), simplexity is delivered more interactively.254 It asks taxpayers simplified questions about underlying facts and provides personalized answers to taxpayers specific questions.255 Because of the tailored nature of their questions and answers and
the illusion of speaking directly with the IRS, taxpayers might be persuaded to directly
talk with the IRS and be induced to higher reliance on these services instead of seeking
help from professional advisors.256 Nonetheless, when the legal issues underlying
the taxpayers question rely upon factual assumptions or involve ambiguous legal
249

See Rodney P. Mock & Nancy E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV.
443, 507 (2014).
250
See id. at 463.
251
See Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor are Paying for Government Benefits:
Fixing the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse, in CRITICAL TAX THEORY 276, 27677 (Anthony
C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2010).
252
See generally Sarah Lawsky, Form as Formalization, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L. J. 115 (2020)
(arguing that tax preparation programs do not encode the law but encode the tax forms).
253
Compare successful uses of the TurboTax defense in Thompson v. Commr, 94 T.C.M.
(CCH) 24, 25 (2007), and Olsen v. Commr, No. 11658-10S, 2011 BL 399552 (T.C. Nov. 23,
2011), with the majority of cases which have been unsuccessful in asserting a viable TurboTax
defense: Bunney v. Commr, 114 T.C. 259, 267 (2000); Lam v. Commr, 99 T.C.M. (CCH)
1347, 1349 (2010); Parker v. Commr, No. 26478-08S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-78, 2010 BL
382909; Au v. Commr, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 400 (2010); Anyika v. Commr, 101 T.C.M. (CCH)
1322 (2011). For the academic debate, see Jay A. Soled & Kathleen D. Thomas, Regulating
Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 151, 17179 (2017), and Rodney P. Mock & Nancy
E. Shurtz, The TurboTax Defense, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 443, 47680 (2014).
254
Blank & Osofsky, Legal Calculators, supra note 187, at 74, 75; see also Blank &
Osofsky, supra note 22, at 184.
255
Blank & Osofsky, supra note 22, at 218; Blank & Osofsky, Legal Calculators, supra
note 187, at 75.
256
Blank & Osofsky, supra note 22, at 202.
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standards, automated legal guidance systems may provide suggestions at odds with
what the law prescribes.257 Thus, the core question is whether taxpayers can rely on
the guidance delivered by these services, their legal value, and the consequences of
erroneous advice. According to the IRS, taxpayers should not be entitled to tax
penalty abatement in cases of erroneous advice provided by the ITA. 258 Furthermore, scholars have already highlighted that even though the taxpayers could try to
defend themselves by asserting that the advice received by ITA is a reasonable
cause and good faith defense against accuracy-related tax penalties, this appears to
be a dead-end strategy.259 Moreover, the increasing use of legal calculators is also a
reaction to the budget cuts of the IRS, which has reduced the number of customer
service agents and thus, impacted taxpayers possibility to receive assistance.260
Since wealthy taxpayers can afford counselors and eventually request a private letter
ruling behind the payment of a fee directly from the IRS, it derives that middle- and
lower-income individuals are the groups who most likely will turn to ITA for
help.261 For the same reason, they will also be the group primarily using tax preparation software for filling and submitting their tax return electronically. At the same time,
complexities and issues pointed out concerning the digital divide when services are
digitally provided by governments become relevant also in this context.262
Free pre-filled tax returns provided by governments and automated legal guidance
based on simplexity can be a step forward for lower-income taxpayers who cannot
afford a tax advisor.263 Nevertheless, the lack of clarity regarding the consequences
257

Id. 21017.
Id. at 234. Unlike private letter rulings issued to specific taxpayers, the IRS does not
consider statements by ITA to be written advice upon which taxpayers can rely. Moreover,
on the ITA website, the IRS explicitly states that the penalty abatement provision (section
6404(f) IRC), which applies when the IRS provides erroneous advice to taxpayers, does not
apply to any statements provided by ITA.
259
Id.
260
Press Release, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, TIGTA Report: New
Web-based Tool Gets Good Reviews From IRS Taxpayer Assistors (May 10, 2011), https://
www.treasury.gov/tigta/press/press_tigta-2011-24.htm [https://perma.cc/LYX7-JF6Y]. For
the overall risks deriving from the underfunding of the IRS, see generally Leandra Lederman,
The IRS, Politics, and Income Inequality, 150 TAX NOTES 1329, 1329, 133132 (2016).
261
Internal Revenue Service Operations and the Presidents Budget for Fiscal Year 2016:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin., 114th Cong. 58 (2015) (statement of Hon. John A.
Koskinen, Commr of Internal Revenue).
262
See supra Part I.
263
The revision of government-private industry preparer partnership providing free Internet tax preparation and filing services has been long advised by academic and policy makers
as well. See IOTA, supra note 83, at 56, 10 and also Lipman, supra note 251, at 27980,
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of making mistakes due to incorrect automated legal guidance, combined with the
issues arising from tax preparation software leaves middle- and lower-income taxpayers in a critical situation. On the one hand, relying on suggestions provided by
technological solutions as ITA, they might ultimately be misguided.264 On the other
hand, when filling in and submitting their tax returns, their fears get monetized under
the payment of a fee for additional services to seek only purported reassurance.265
Consequently, lower-income taxpayers are once again the ones paying the higher price
of the implications of the privatization of public functions due to budget constraints.
IV. AUTOMATING LAW FOR NON-AVERAGE CITIZENS
The digitization and automation of government, in particular of tax obligations and
social security benefits, have important legal implications: citizens may be unfairly and
unequally treated, misled by privately developed software, and fall prey to obscure
fraud detection software.266 When this happens, they may also be unable to fully
understand how decisions against them were made, and not have full access to administrative justice. Drawing on the cases exposed in Part II and their legal implications (Part III), this Part focuses on the discussion of the overlooked crux of the
problem and how to solve it: the failure to design digital government, automation,
and law enforcement for all citizens, rather than for the average tech-savvy, middleincome citizen.
Digital government and its respective automated systems are primarily designed
for so-called average citizens who have access to the Internet, have typical literacy
and digital skills, and can thus apply for public services and exercise their rights
online without requiring any additional assistance.267 However, law is not designed
only for average citizens. Instead, in a modern Western legal system guided by the
rule of law, law confers rights and obligations to all citizens and in many cases, also
to legal residents, regardless of their ethnicity, gender, age, income, and ability to participate in the digital society.268 Digital tools that focus only on average tech-savvy
citizens, leaving out millions of citizens who do not fit the technological narrative,
generate by definition a situation of inequality.269 This effect was visible in the
digital tax cases (Part II) where thousands of citizens were wrongfully punished
for not being able to navigate both the legal and digital systems. This situation was
also the result of the so-called low-hanging fruit enforcement (Part III), which targets
vulnerable citizens. Even though the law is equal for everyone, the digitization of
264
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government transactions and fraud detection results in more punishment of the most
vulnerable citizens in our society.270 These citizens are in a detrimental position first
because they are less well-versed in the use of technology and may thus make mistakes.271 Second, these citizens are more easily caught by automated systems that
interpret their mistakes or oversights as attempted fraud or risk of committing fraud.272
Automated bureaucracy together with the opacity of systems and the desire to cut
costs has thus dehumanizing consequences for non-average citizens. However, tax
administrations do not take into account the needs of vulnerable citizens because
when citizens do not have a documented disability, their challenges are invisible.
This Part addresses this gap by delving into the concepts of vulnerability and vulnerable citizens and providing some insights into how the needs of vulnerable
citizens (regardless of the source of their vulnerability) should also be accounted for
in the design of digital government.
A. Average vs. Vulnerable Citizens
As Part II showed, the acritical digitization and automation of government has
a particularly detrimental impact on vulnerable citizens. In 2019, the UN Special
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights strongly criticized the digitalization and automation of public services, including when applied to welfare benefits.273
The UN Rapporteur shed light on how instead of ameliorating the services provided
to citizens, technology was putting the human rights of the poorest and most vulnerable at risk.274 The lack of transparency and algorithmic biases were among the
causes of discrimination and consequent exclusion.275 For the young, middle-class,
educated, and tech-savvy citizens, digitalization expanded access to state services.
But for senior citizens, low-income individuals, and many invisible minorities, it
excluded them. This section explains more in detail how this phenomenon occurs,
even when the text of the law seeks to guarantee equality among citizens.
270
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The digital technology employed to digitize government services, or make
automated decisions, aims to optimize administration. Therefore, it treats all citizens
as statistical data or categories: average citizens who have a reasonable understanding of the law, have the ability to fill in forms, can understand how government
websites work, and can thus use them. These systems simplify the law and the language that is used, but they are not overly patronizing. Average citizens can engage
independently with technology and require little assistance. Interestingly, it is not
easy to support the technological perception of the average citizen as a reasonably
tech-savvy (male) citizen. The average citizen for the technology industry developing software does not necessarily match the statistical reality, especially in racially,
ethnically, and income diverse countries like the United States. In 2018, the Washington
Post ran a profile of the average citizen based on Census Bureau data and recent
polling and concluded that the average American was a white woman in her fifties, with
a Bachelors degree, average income, who lives in her own house with her spouse.276
The average citizen does not exist from a legal perspective. It is an implicit
category that is supposed to refer to everyone who does not require assistance because of a disability, as established for example, in the Americans with Disabilities
Act.277 There is thus the assumption that citizens can either perform the government
transactions they are by law required to do or if they cannot and are not disabled,
there is something wrong. Since average citizens are indeed the most representative
category statistically speaking, automated systems assume that they can fill in the
required forms for their needed government transactions or can easily afford and use
a tax preparation software like TurboTax. Digital government is designed thus for
individuals with average literacy and digital skills. The assumption is that average
citizens only leave patterns of mistakes (such as the ones that triggered the MiDAS
and the Dutch childcare benefits scandal) if they have the intent to commit fraud.
However, not all citizens are average citizens or are citizens with special needs
that can be legally entitled to permanent assistance in their government transactions.
Also, the idea that the average citizen has certain skills may be statistically true
but it is not sufficiently nuanced and it fails to consider evidence showing that about
130 million Americans lack proficiency in literacy, reading below the equivalent of
a sixth-grade level.278 According to the Pew Research Center, Americas digital literacy
276
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is also lacking, with about sixty percent of adults failing to demonstrate sufficient
digital skills (e.g., ability to detect a phishing scam on social media, website, email
or through text messages; or ability to work with a true two-factor authentication
system).279 This means that millions of citizens who are not officially entitled to
assistance may still find it difficult to engage with digital government.280
In between the categories of average citizens and citizens with special needs,
there are millions of citizens who may commit mistakes due to lack of time, literacy,
mental capacity or unwillingness to engage with technology. There is thus the need
for a third category that better illustrates the different degrees of capabilities of citizens and their needs.
B. Who Is the Vulnerable Citizen?
According to Martha Fineman, we can all be vulnerable citizens, at some point
in life.281 Vulnerability can result from a life event (e.g., death of a loved one), it can
be entirely situational, and it can affect highly educated citizens at a time when they
have less time or mental capacity.282 However, for many citizens, vulnerability is not
only temporary. It is a permanent feature of their lives which can result from an individuals socioeconomic background, ethnicity, education, or income. Vulnerability
has many different sources which are not related to disabilities. Existing scholarship
shows that ethnic minorities are discriminated by algorithmic decision-making
systems that score them negatively, suggest they will commit more often crimes and
welfare fraud, and surveil them more closely than other segments of the population.283 This can generate a feeling of government anxiety, mistrust, and unwillingness to embrace digital technology. Although technology appears to empower
women, they still participate less often than men in digital democratic debates, have
a more reduced digital capital, and are more often trolled on social media.284 Technology still reproduces existing patriarchal attitudes towards gender which limits the
potential of technology to be tools for womens empowerment.
Also, individuals with low literacy cannot understand how new digital processes
work, cannot translate their needs in the most accurate way, consume news that may
279

Emily A. Vogels & Monica Anderson, Americans and Digital Knowledge, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/10/09/americans-and-digital
-knowledge/ [https://perma.cc/YM2U-XZ95].
280
See Nina A. Kohn, Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government, 26 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1, 3 (2014).
281
See Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8 (2008); Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject
and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 267 (2010).
282
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 281.
283
See Ranchordás & Schuurmans, supra note 225, at 2930.
284
See generally Mary Pat Treuthart, Connectivity: The Global Gender Digital Divide and
Its Implications for Womens Human Rights and Equality, 23 GONZ. J. INTL L. 1 (2019).

416

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:373

not be precise, and cannot convey their views or requests accurately in writing.
Because of their reduced digital skills, limited literacy, financial or ethnic background, or mentality, these citizens are not treated equally and experience; the digitalization of public services is limiting their ability to exercise their rights before
public bodies. Vulnerability before government thus amounts to the full or partial
inability to exercise rights before public authorities and participate in public life on
equal terms, citizens may feel excluded and unfairly treated by government.285 Administrative vulnerability may be caused either by exogenous (e.g., socioeconomic
conditions) or endogenous factors (e.g., psychological conditions, time, illiteracy). 286
It is a reality that does not only affect low-income or marginalized populations, but
also, in the context of digital government, it can affect anyone regardless of education or income.287 The design of digital government overlooks this administrative
vulnerability. Therefore, this concept that most of us know too well, still does not
exist in Western systems of public law that regard the citizen as an individual with
the average ability to engage with government and its digital tools.
C. How to Account for Vulnerable Citizens
This section offers some suggestions to accommodate the needs of vulnerable
citizens. First, it would be important to ensure that tax preparation software is developed by tax authorities in order to guarantee that citizens do not have to incur
into costs so as to comply with their legal obligations. This also ensures that lowincome citizens do not have to purchase software they do not need or that gives
them the false impression that they are embracing the most advantageous interpretation of the law. If simplicity and efficiency are key goals of digital government, they
should be provided directly by governments and not outsourced to private companies
who have a financial interest in sustaining simplexity. Therefore, if governments
wish to protect vulnerable citizens, they should do it themselves, rather than trusting
private companies to intermediate their transactions with citizens.
Second, the distance between material law and tax enforcement should be equal
for every citizen, regardless of whether they are a case of low-hanging fruit enforcement (easy to detect, unlikely to litigate, with high revenue for tax authority as
result) or a complex case of enforcement, requiring additional investigations. The
Dutch childcare benefits scandal demonstrated that targeting vulnerable citizens on
the grounds of their immigration background was an uncomplicated way to obtain
285
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rapid results by running simple automated checks. The detection of mistakes was not
difficult, particularly because many low-income parents did not have the resources
to seek professional advice.288 However, this approach to enforcement is unequal
and biased. It means that those who can seek professional tax and legal advice will
not be as easily targeted, even though they could have committed fraud and if that
is the case, they could probably protect their legal positions better. The law is thus
not as harshly enforced for the average middle-income citizen as it is for the nonaverage or vulnerable taxpayer. The revision of this tax enforcement strategy may
be undesirable from a financial point of view, but it is necessary to guarantee that public law enforcement stays true to the key values of administrative law. As explained
in Part III, these values include efficiency but not at the cost of inequality or dehumanization of the contact with citizens.
Third, we support the proposal by Leslie Book, T. Keith Fogg, and Nina E.
Olson, on the introduction of a Taxpayer Rights Impact Statement, which is meant
to assess current and future IRS systems by conducting a systematic review of the
impact of its actions on taxpayer rights.289
Fourth, tax and social security law are complex and highly detailed legal systems.
This means that citizens will continue to make mistakes when filling in forms, but
digital government and automation are not going to be abolished. On the contrary,
it is highly likely that they will be further advanced. In order to accommodate the
situation of vulnerable citizens, governments could equate forgiving more mistakes
or providing additional opportunities for citizens to correct errors in their forms. For
example, this option has been established by law in France with the so-called right
to make a mistake which allows French citizens to make one mistake in good faith
once in their lives without any legal consequences.290 The French government also
created a website (oops.gov.fr) with common mistakes made by citizens along with
checklists on how a citizen, at different moments in life (e.g., moving, birth of a
child, unemployment, death of a loved one) should perform certain government
transactions.291 While this solution is far from perfect, it shows a movement toward
more empathy, less harsh and inequalitarian enforcement of law against vulnerable
citizens. The creation of public programs of digital assistance is also another way
of helping vulnerable citizens comply with their obligations without the intermediation of privately developed technology.
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CONCLUSION
The partial or full automation of administrative decision-making in itself is neither
good nor bad. Nevertheless, automated systems must remain within the limits of the
law, be responsive, and promote the efficiency of public administrations without
endangering the rule of law, procedural fairness, and the accountability of public
authorities.292 It is important to underline that automated decision-making also addresses some of the issues for which administrative law was created: Public authorities may be tempted to use their discretionary powers for unwarranted purposes or
to prioritize personal gains over the public interest, resulting in wrongful and
disproportionate decisions. In an ideal world, automation could work as a limiting
force to a source of mistakes and incorrect administrative decisions if it is combined
with human judgment.293 Nevertheless, this requires that government officials do not
resort to private software intermediaries or design technology themselves that aims
to primarily target government efficiencies at the cost of vulnerable citizens.
Automated systems that are intermediated by private technology or are primarily
guided by efficiency values place vulnerable citizens in a disadvantageous situation
for two reasons. First, citizens that are qualified as being part of an underrepresented
group (for example, in the case of the Dutch childcare benefit scandal, Dutch citizens
with an Antillean background) are caught in the system, given a negative ranking
or score (e.g., higher risk of welfare fraud) because of their nationality, ethnicity,
gender, or socioeconomic status.294 Existing data is interpreted against them, and
given the absence of a true critical eye of the human-in-the-loop, these citizens are
qualified as possible fraudsters.295 Who they are determines who they become in the
eyes of the digital system. Second, vulnerable citizens are also excluded by the way
in which digital technology is designed and what digital government expects from
them in terms of skills, time, and education. A fair and equalitarian automation of
government and tax enforcement should ensure that digital government is designed
also with the needs of vulnerable citizens in mind. This means enhanced simplification of forms, more information from the side of government, publicly developed
software and instructions, more digital or human assistance, and, as it shall be further
developed in a companion article, more administrative empathy for mistakes made
in good faith.
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